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This thesis examines a conception of self in Wei-Jin 魏晋 thought, specifically expressed 
by Guo Xiang 郭象 (d. 312) in his famous commentary to the Zhuangzi 庄子. My 
contention is this: Guo Xiang’s contribution to the Wei-Jin dialogue on “human nature” 
xing 性, “human emotions” qing 情 and sagehood, is the cornerstone to an understanding 
of the self that harmonizes the xing-core of the individual with the interrelatedness of the 
universe.1  
 
Uncovering Guo Xiang’s view and its implications for the notion of self in 
Chinese thought is crucial for two reasons. First, it provides another perspective on the 
continuing controversy over the issue of the self in the Chinese context – Guo Xiang’s 
                                                
1 The definition of xing is not without its complications. In this thesis, I will sidestep the conceptual issues 
of xing and use the basic definition of xing as “human nature” throughout. For further readings on the 
issues involved in the conception of xing, please see Roger T. Ames, “The Mencian Conception of Ren 
xing 人性: Does It Mean Human Nature?” in Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts: Essays dedicated 
to Angus C. Graham, ed. Henry Rosemont, Jr. (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1991) 143-175; Shun 
Kwong-loi, “Mencius on Jen-hsing,” Philosophy East and West, Vol. 47, no. 1, Human Nature in Chinese 
Philosophy: A Panel of the 1995 Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies (Jan., 1997): 1-20; 
Liu Shu-Hsien and Shun Kwong-loi, “Some Reflections on Mencius Views of Heart-Mind and Human 
Nature,” Philosophy East and West, Vol. 46, no. 2 (Apr., 1996): 143-164; Irene Bloom, “Mencian 
Arguments on Human Nature (Jen-hsing),”  Philosophy East and West, Vol. 44, no. 1 (1994): 19-53, and 
“Human Nature and Biological Nature in Mencius,” Philosophy East and West, Vol. 47, no. 1 (1997): 21-
32;  Maurizio Scarpari, “Mencius and Xunzi on Human Nature: The Concept of Moral Autonomy in Early 
Confucian Tradition,” Review of Culture 34-35 (1998): 65-87.  
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thought challenges us to re-think the dominant approach to the Chinese sense of self, one 
that construes the self in relational terms. Second, an analysis of Guo Xiang’s work, 
especially in light of its departure from the mainstream relational understanding of self, 
opens up the possibility of an “essentialist” interpretation of selfhood. This essentialist 
understanding refers to the idea that our xing is endowed by Dao and is present in us from 
birth; it emphasizes the irreducibility of our xing-core while doing full justice to the 
relatedness of the human experience at the same time. 
 
Before continuing, a few words need to be said about this study. First and 
foremost, I am not claiming that Guo Xiang’s work captures the entire spectrum of the 
Wei-Jin thinking of self. I am fully aware that Wei-Jin thought is characterized by a 
diversity of voices, representing a smorgasbord of theories concerning the interpretation 
of Dao and sagehood.2 In this respect, my work is not directed at a grand narrative of the 
Wei-Jin notion of self. Chiefly, the brevity of this thesis does not allow me to capture the 
full range of theories germane to the notion of self during this period. However, during 
the course of my research on the nature of self in Wei-Jin philosophical discourse, I 
discovered that there is a rather interesting and significant view that construes the self in 
essentialist terms. This is found mainly in the interpretation of the Zhuangzi by Guo 
Xiang, who was the main commentator and editor of the text.3 Second, it is important to 
note here that Guo Xiang did not develop a full-fledged theory of the self. Rather, my 
                                                
2 For an excellent account of the diversity of neo-Daoist thought in Wei-Jin China, please see Alan K.L. 
Chan, “Neo-Daoism,” in History of Chinese Philosophy, ed. Bo Mou (London; New York: Routledge, 
2009), 1-41. 
3 Most philosophers agree that the Zhuangzi is a composite text, consisting of four distinct strands of Daoist 
thought. Only the Inner Chapters (Chapters 1-7, 16-27 and 32) belong to Zhuangzi’s school of thought. The 
rest are classified by A.C. Graham as the school of primitivists (Chapters 8-10), syncretists (Chapters 11-
15, 33) and the hedonists (Chapters 28-31). For more on the different aspects of thought found in the 
Zhuangzi, please see Livia Kohn, Introducing Daoism (London; New York: Routledge, 2009), 39-42. 
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claim is that we can infer from Guo Xiang’s work on xing a notion of self that fuses a 
Daoist “essential” nature with the pervasiveness of human relations. Hence, the 
underlying intent of my work is to examine how Guo Xiang appropriates from the 
Zhuangzi to formulate an essentialist understanding that locates selfhood in the Dao-
endowed xing of the individual while allowing him to function in an integrated way with 
the world.  
 
In the remainder of this Introduction, I shall articulate the present scholarly 
context that frames my study through a discussion of Roger Ames’ “focus-field” 
approach to the relational self. To the extent that Ames’ view represents the dominant 
approach to the topic of the self in Chinese philosophy, explicating his view puts us in a 
better position to appreciate the full significance of the conception of self that is implied 
in Guo Xiang’s commentary on the Zhuangzi. That said, a meaningful exposition of 
Ames’ view in turn requires a brief sketch of the Western “individualistic” conception of 
self that he pits his theory against. To that end, the rest of this Introduction will outline 
the issues associated with imposing an individualistic Western understanding of the self 
on Chinese thought, leading into an examination of Ames’ theory. To bring my analysis 
of Guo Xiang’s work into a sharper focus, I will address the following questions 
pertaining to Ames’ view of the relational self: What are the key characteristics of the 
focus-field model of the relational self? How is the xing of a person commonly 
understood in the relational self?  How do concepts such as qing bear on the relational 
self? Why is the idea of the relational self opposed to an essentialist interpretation that 
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locates selfhood in the individual? 
 
This brings us to the main body of this thesis which examines a Wei-Jin 
conception of self that is implicit in Guo Xiang’s work. Chapter One presents the 
historical and philosophical background that is essential to grasping the key thrust of Guo 
Xiang’s work on xing. In broad strokes, I will outline the socio-political environment that 
helped shape the Wei-Jin understanding of self. Following that, I will trace the 
beginnings of the philosophical exchanges on xing, qing and sagehood in early Chinese 
philosophy, highlighting the key intellectual tendencies that will continue into the Wei-
Jin dialogue on xing. Specifically in the Wei-Jin context, I will explore a range of views 
starting from He Yan and Wang Bi, leading into Guo Xiang’s account of xing.  
 
Chapter Two zooms in on Guo Xiang’s thought, revealing the view of self that 
lies behind his understanding of xing. I will address questions such as: What is Guo 
Xiang’s account of xing? How do his concepts of ziran 自然 (spontaneity) and duhua 
独化 (independent transformation) bear on the notion of the self? What are the 
philosophical implications of Guo Xiang’s notion of xing? Finally, in the Concluding 
Remarks I offer my reflection on the significance of Guo Xiang’s work on the concept of 
self in Chinese philosophy. 
 
 
  5 
Problem of the self in Chinese thought 
 
The question “What is the Chinese conception of self?” has given rise to intense debate. 
To fully appreciate the academic furor over this topic, we must first understand the nature 
of the problem. Given the Western origins of the concept of self, a philosopher’s 
foremost instinct is to find out whether the Western theories of self can capture the 
nuances of the Chinese conception of self adequately. 
 
In the Western tradition, the sense of self is generally underpinned by an 
“individualistic” definition of human beings. This is the understanding that what gives 
human beings their primary worth is their capacity to be autonomous, rational and free.4 
Such a view of selfhood is characterized by the following features.5 First, the Western 
philosophical heritage construes the self as a unitary construct of subjectivity and 
objectivity, i.e., with boundaries between the self and the world (including one’s body). 
This lays the groundwork for a post-Cartesian sense of self as an agent, mind or 
consciousness that comprehends an outer world of events. Such an understanding is 
based on a dualism that assumes the existence of two distinct principles of being: mind 
and body. Second, as a conscious entity, the self is unique, discrete and identifiable. 
Theorists who are concerned with the inner state of self usually talk about ideas of the 
abstract self and its inner core of uniqueness, irreducibility and inviolability. From this 
perspective, the individual possesses certain key inner traits (capacities and character) 
                                                
4 Henry Rosemont, Jr. and Roger T. Ames, The Chinese Classic of Family Reverence: A Philosophical 
Translation of the Xiaojing (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2009), 36. 
5 A good summary of the post-Cartesian notion of self is found in Frank Johnson, “The Western Concept of 
Self,” in Culture and Self: Asian and Western Perspectives, eds. Anthony J. Marsella, George SeVos, and 
Francis L.K. Hsu (New York and London: Tavistock Publications, 1985). 
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that are deemed to be unique, independent of any relations or interactions that he forms 
with an external order such as his family or society at large.6 This gives rise to the 
construal of the self as an individuating model of autonomy and locus of personal 
identity, covering a catholicity of concepts relating to consciousness, intentionality, 
cognition, rationality, will, freedom, choices, and responsibilities, and so on. Third, the 
polarities of the inner and outer world often reveal an implicit tension between the self 
and an external order.7 This results in the tendency to affirm the isolation of the 
superordinated self that exists over and above the external order.  
 
Philosophers like Steven Lukes recognize that such a Western way of valorizing 
the self as the centre of power, knowledge, actions, beliefs and values “indelibly marks 
every interpretation we give of other modes of thought and every attempt we make to 
revise our own.”8 This causes prominent scholars (like Ames, David Hall, Henry 
Rosemont, Herbert Fingarette and others) to react against what they see as a misleading 
way to grasp the phenomenon of self in Chinese philosophy. In Thinking from the Han: 
Self, Truth and Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture, Hall and Ames suggest 
that the meaning of self in the Chinese context cannot appeal to Western “semantic 
contexts defined by metaphors of matter, mind, organism, and will.”9 In their view, the 
simple fact is that these categories are misdirected and irrelevant to the Chinese 
understanding of self.  
                                                
6 Donald J. Munro, “Introduction,” in Individualism and Holism: Studies in Confucian and Taoist Values, 
ed. Donald J. Munro (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1985), 16. 
7 Ibid., 21-22. 
8 Steven Lukes, “Conclusion,” in The Category of Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History, eds. 
Michael Carrithers, Steven Collins, and Steven Lukes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 
298. 
9 David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth, and Transcendence in Chinese and 
Western Culture (Albany, NY: State of New York University Press, 1998), 11-21. 
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Such thinking helps to spur a wave of enthusiasm for scholars who contend that 
the Chinese conception of self must be construed differently from the Western 
“individualistic” standpoint. Their argument is usually based on the claim that the 
dynamics of mind-body dualism is not present in Chinese thinking.10 Therefore, imposing 
a Western atomistic perspective does not work because the notion of the unitary self does 
not issue from Chinese thought. Neither is the self conceived as a distinct locus of 
identity and decision-making in the Chinese context. Consequently, within the corpus of 
Chinese writings, we do not find any preoccupation with questions about correspondence 
between subjective and objective worlds, or a focus on an inner world of human agency.  
 
Further, if we were to characterize the Chinese sense of self by drawing from the 
Western “semantic contexts” (and its concomitant premium on discreteness, autonomy 
and individuality), the traditional Chinese ideal is often perceived as a “phalanx of 
selfless persons” who are absorbed by a larger whole such as the society or cosmos.11 
This is not to concede that the Western understanding of self cannot be applied to the 
Chinese context. Rather, it is the misconception that this sense of “selflessness” is 
                                                
10 Within the Chinese intellectual tradition, “thinking” and “feeling” are not perceived as separate functions 
of the human experience. The non-dual character of xin 心 ( heart-mind) and the non-teleological character 
of Dao means that xin is always functioning in an integrated way with its environment. For more of this 
understanding, please see Hall and Ames, Thinking from the Han, 28-38. Also see Mary I. Bockover, “The 
Concept of Emotion Revisited: A Critical Synthesis of Western and Confucian Thought,” in Emotions in 
Asian Thought: A Dialogue in Comparative Philosophy, eds. Joel Marks and Roger T. Ames (Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press, 1995), 161-167. 
11 Hall and Ames, Thinking from the Han, 24. The idea of a “selfless” person presupposes the existence of 
an individuated person that must be sacrificed for some higher, common good. For more readings of the 
Chinese ideal, please see works by Donald J. Munro, “The Shape of Chinese Values in the Eye of an 
American Philosopher,” in The China Difference, ed. R. Terrill (New York: Harper & Row,1979), 40; and 
R. Randle Edwards “Civil and Social Rights: Theory and Practice in Chinese Law Today,” 44, Louis 
Henkin, “The Human Rights Idea in Contemporary China: A Comparative Perspective,” 39, Andrew J. 
Nathan, “Sources of Chinese Rights Thinking,” 141-147 all in Human Rights in Contemporary China, eds., 
R. Edwards, L. Henkins, and A. Nathan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). 
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characteristic of the Chinese ideal of “self-abnegation” and collectivism, which is 
motivated by the need to subjugate individual interests to the higher interest of the group.  
 
Besides, the effort to delineate the self in Chinese thought is marked by a most 
galling problem: Within the Chinese intellectual tradition, there seems to be no single 
term that corresponds to the sense of self. Classical Chinese thought has no exact 
equivalent of the term “self,” but a rich variety of substitutive terminologies such as ji 己, 
wo 我, ren 人, etc. Lacking a principal term of reference, the notion of self could only be 
ferreted from a cluster of “self-cognates.”12 Conceivably, this complicates the entire 
matter of the understanding of self in Chinese philosophy. 
 
                                                
12 Hall and Ames, Thinking from the Han, 5. Both Hall and Ames acknowledge that such “vague reality” 
that informs the search for the self comes from the fact that the Chinese sense of self can only be “evoked” 
from this cluster of associated meanings that lacks logical and semantic coherence. 
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The relatedness of human experience 
 
To address these issues, philosophers suggest that perhaps we should not explore the 
Chinese notion of self from the putative Western perspective that is based on an 
individualistic construal of humanity. Instead, we should examine the notion of self from 
the Chinese perspective that is based on the “relatedness” of human experience. Let me 
explain further. Notwithstanding the difficulties in defining the self, it is generally agreed 
that the whole enterprise of self in the Chinese context is commonly discussed in relation 
to the idea of human actualization.13 Classical Chinese thinkers regard the project of self-
cultivation as one that bears on the individual’s relationship with the myriad things in the 
universe. Concepts of self-realization often employ the language of “interdependence 
rather than independence,” “complementarity rather than autonomy” because of the 
interrelated and dynamic nature of the individual’s relationship with the world.14  
 
                                                
13 Munro, “Introduction,” 3-14. Throughout early Chinese philosophy, the importance of a person’s relation 
to the universe has always been emphasized. While both classical Confucianism and Daoism advocate self-
cultivation and the individual’s contribution to the universe, both doctrines define self-cultivation in 
different ways. For Confucianism, the focus on integration with the human world gives the concept of self-
cultivation a practical socio-political patina. For Daoism, the model of self-cultivation extends from the 
emulation of a human order to the emulation of a cosmic order. Even then, the thread of unity does not run 
through the conception of self-cultivation in classical Daoism – one can still detect differences within the 
corpus of early Daoist thought. For instance, Laozi’s Daodejing 道德经 is a political treatise of the sage-
ruler who sets the socio-political conditions for personal-realization. Hence, it is clear that the concern is 
about the social and political implications of the sage-ruler’s enlightenment on the state. This is contrasted 
to the Zhuangzi that emphasizes personal development while shunning secular concerns. 
14 Hall and Ames, Thinking from the Han, 25. 
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Such an understanding stems from a unique view of the universe based on yin 阴 
and yang 阳, opposing yet complementary cosmic forces that are interdependent and 
mutually entailing. Hall and Ames explain that the “dualism” of yin-yang is clearly quite 
different from the Western cosmology: 
 
The cosmological contrasts in the Western tradition have tended toward 
exclusive dualisms; those in China toward complementary pairings. The 
basic polarity in China will doubtless involve mutually implicated 
contrasts (“light” and “dark”, “active” and “receptive”). The basic polarity 
in the West will involve mutually inconsistent pairings.15  
 
 
In the absence of a worldview of “exclusive dualisms,” the construal of self in the 
Chinese tradition cannot belong to the Western idea of the unitary self that is discrete and 
independent. In other words, Chinese thinking does not view humanity as individual 
digits of persons who exist apart from the environment. Instead, individuals are viewed as 
interconnected human beings who function in a mutually entailing environment. 
Therefore, it is important that the Chinese notion of self must account for the 
interdependent nature of a person’s relationship with the others. Both Hall and Ames 
concur: 
 
[even if the] Western notion of the separate, distinct individual in its 
various forms is anathema to the Chinese, [w]e should not, however, think 
that [just] because we most often associate self-actualization with 
individuated existence, there can be no appreciation and personal 
enjoyment of an alternative understanding of uniqueness among the 
Chinese.16 
                                                
15 Hall and Ames, Thinking from the Han, 82. 
16 Ibid., 89.  
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According to Hall and Ames, such an “alternative understanding of uniqueness 
among the Chinese” may rule out autonomous individuality; but it may not necessarily 
obviate the uniqueness that is manifested in a person’s roles and relationships stemming 
from his interaction with the world.  (I will return to this point of “uniqueness” later when 
I discuss Ames’ idea of the relational self.)  
 
In the famous discussion between Herbert Fingarette and Ames over the 
Confucian notion of self, Fingarette asks a compelling question that resonates with the 
larger complexities of the interpretation of self in Chinese thought: “Why should we reify 
‘self’ by giving it the independent noun form in English, and thus impute to Confucius 
the notion of some inner entity, some core of one’s being – whether egoistical or ideal?”17 
Fingarette’s concern with this notion of “inner entity” originates from the attempt to 
delineate the Confucian notion of self on the basis of the Western idea of integrated 
selfhood that emphasizes the isolation of the individual while denying the interactive 
character of human development. 
 
In light of this, the problem of the self in Chinese philosophy is perhaps not with 
its conceptual definition as such. The real problem is how we, as modern readers, make 
sense of such a way of thinking about the self in Chinese thought. The consensus among 
                                                
17 Please see Herbert Fingarette, “The Problem of the Self in the Analects,” Philosophy East and West Vol. 
29, no. 2 (April 1979): 129-140; Roger T. Ames, “Reflections on the Confucian Self: A Response to 
Fingarette,” in Rules, Rituals, and Responsibility: Essays Dedicated to Herbert Fingarette, ed. Mary I. 
Bockover (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1991), 104-114. The question that is quoted is found specifically on 
p. 199 in Fingarette’s response to Ames, “Comment and Response,” in Rules, Rituals, and Responsibility, 
194-200. 
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most scholars is that the relatedness of the human experience in Chinese culture would 
appeal to a significantly different way of understanding the self compared to Western 
philosophy. For a notion of self in Chinese thought to obtain, we must appreciate Chinese 
sensibilities as such.  
  13 
The relational understanding of self 
 
In recognition of the fact that the Chinese sense of self is construed quite differently from 
the Western tradition, modern scholars have resorted to various theories to explain the 
notion of self based on the central idea of relatedness in human experience.18 The most 
dominant theory today belongs to Ames’ focus-field approach to the relational self. 
Drawing upon classical Confucian and Daoist sources as the basis for his arguments, he 
advances the idea that Chinese sensibilities are largely informed by a relational 
understanding of the self. This gives rise to his view that selfhood is located in relations, 
and that “human nature” xing 性 is defined by its ongoing relations with the world.19 He 
believes that the relational self is not only prevalent in Chinese culture, but the focus-
                                                
18 Most philosophers agree that there is a plurality of views on the nature of self in Chinese thought. Most 
have turned to “holistic” theories to explain the Chinese sense of self. For more on the holistic explanations 
of self please see Appendix A of this thesis. 
19 Hall and Ames, Thinking from the Han, 277-279. It is important to note that Ames has not written 
specifically on the details of this claim. Nonetheless, in arguing against using a Western framework that 
views selfhood as “individualistic,” his writings have often reflected his belief that the idea of the relational 
self has informed most part of Chinese thought and tradition. Therefore, the topic of self must be 
approached from the angle of relatedness that is dominant in Chinese thought. In Thinking from the Han, 
Ames expresses this belief on the issue of human rights in China: 
The concept of the natural human condition that has held sway in the Chinese tradition is 
radically different, and in many ways anathema to individualistic notions in terms of 
which Western doctrines of human rights have often been framed. 
Ames goes on to write that the Chinese culture is “largely persuaded” by a Mencian conception of “human 
nature” xing 性 whereby the human being arises from a spontaneous matrix of relationships that shapes and 
defines his nature and character: 
The fact that the Chinese tradition has been largely persuaded by the Mencian-based 
definition of human “nature” described above rather than by any theoretically fortified 
notion of discrete individuality has profound implications for the way in which the soil of 
China has responded to the human rights transplant. First there is no philosophical basis 
that will justify “self” as a locus of interests independent of and prior to society. Under 
the sway of a relational understanding of human nature, the mutuality of personal, 
societal, and political realization has been generally assumed [italics are my own]. 
Here, Ames’ comments seem to allude to the view that the sense of self in the Chinese tradition is 
relational, and that xing is also relational, formed by its interactions with the environment. 
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field approach is also a representative model for understanding the self in the Chinese 
context.20  
 
Ames holds that the relatedness of human experience is underpinned by a 
dynamic structure of qi (气) cosmology that is depicted by the ever-changing processes 
of becoming.21 In this phenomenal world, qi pervades the universe and is the site for the 
shared continuity and interdependence of all things. Ames maintains that qi is not a 
transcendental principle or essence. Rather, it is the “energizing field [that] is expressed 
as the unique and always changing foci of every thing that comes to constitute our 
experience.”22  In this respect, human experience is a field “both focused by and bringing 
into focus” the qi of the myriad things that comprise it.23 Consequently, Ames views the 
world as a protean structure, “an open-ended affair comprised by ‘thises’ and ‘thats’ 
construable from any number of distinct perspectives.”24 
 
Ames stresses that the relatedness of human experience gives rise to the idea that 
the self is defined as the locus of relations with the world. The central feature of this 
relational self is that it “allies” itself with the contexts that it constitutes, as these contexts 
in turn constitute the self.25 Such an “art of contextualization involves the production of 
harmonious correlations of the myriad unique details (wan wu 万物 or wan you 万有) 
                                                
20 Ames relies heavily on the early Confucian and Daoist texts to establish the validity of his claim. In order 
not to detract from the flow of the argument, I will discuss his depiction of the relational self in classical 
Confucianism and Daoism in the Appendix B of this thesis. 
21 Roger T. Ames, Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary, 12 (unpublished manuscript, forthcoming). 
22 Ibid., 19. 
23 Ibid., 25. 
24 Hall and Ames, Thinking from the Han, 40. 
25 Ibid. 
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that make up the world.”26 In this way, the process of “contextualization” involves a 
strong element of human engagement that takes into account the unique details of the 
contexts.  
 
The foremost implication of Ames’ focus-field approach is that the self becomes 
purely constituted by its relationship to the world – each unique self emerges from the 
focus-field of relations that contextualizes it. Thus, the relational self does not refer to 
one single self but multiple selves that arise from the different contexts. Second, in the 
absence of (external) transcendental origins, such a relationally constituted self is not 
only unique but self-sufficient. Third, the relational self arises from a collaborative 
process of proactive participation and interaction that establishes “I am not defined by 
what I am born with,” but “I am defined by what I do.” In this sense, just as the 
relationships with the other people shape me, I am also actively shaping the nature of 
these relationships I have with them. Fourth, selfhood is an open network of many 
perspectives or foci of relationships that are differentiated. There is no single teleological 
entity or principle that governs these relationships. 
 
 
                                                
26 Hall and Ames, Thinking from the Han, 40. 
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Particularity and uniqueness of relationships 
 
Since the workings of the universe do not presuppose a transcendental being, essence, or 
principle, the Chinese order is immanent in that the self is never independent of the social 
and natural environments that constitute it. 27 Given that the model of self is no longer 
teleological driven, there is no transcendental entity to set a pre-determined course on 
things. The contextual self becomes self-determined and self-sufficient in the dynamic 
world. Its uniqueness is occasioned by its response to the particular nature of each 
situation, and by getting itself re-negotiated in every circumstance.  
 
Ames posits that the Confucian model of self is an “open system” that is 
invariably connected to the family, community, society, state and cosmos.28 Thus, the 
self’s creative contribution to the provisional pattern of social discourse is achieved by 
maximizing its possibilities in each situation. Each self is specific and unique because it 
is an abstraction from a constantly shifting matrix of roles and relationships. The self “is 
always a local, embodied, and site-specific correlation of details: a repertory of 
experiences, desires and beliefs, which, in combination, constitute one’s person.”29 In this 
manner, the focus is not on the particular/discrete individual, but on the particularity of 
his relationships with the world. This brings us back to my earlier point on how Hall and 
Ames construe uniqueness in the Chinese context very differently from the Western 
                                                
27 Ames, Confucian Role Ethics, 8-9. 
28 Roger T. Ames and Wimal Dissanayake, “Introduction,” in Self and Deception: A Cross-cultural 
Philosophical Enquiry, eds. Roger T. Ames and Wimal Dissanayake (Albany, NY: State University of New 
York Press, 1996), 4. 
29 Roger T. Ames, “The Classical Chinese Self and Hypocrisy,” in Self and Deception, 229. 
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tradition. Their idea of uniqueness calls our attention to the particularity of an 
individual’s roles and relationships stemming from his interactions with the world.   
 
At this point, it is useful to summarize Ames’ flow of argument here. First, the 
view of Chinese cosmology is such that the myriad things are inseparable from each 
other, locked into mutually entailing relationships that undergo changes all the time. 
Second, in the absence of a teleological being, substance or principle, the Chinese 
conception of self (in both classical Confucian and Daoist works) is such that the self is 
always situated and situational – it is always related to, and never isolated from the 
context it is in. Third, the self reflects the symbiotic and dynamic nature of the cosmos. 
As a consequence, in the self’s engagement with the universe, the nature of the 
relationship is such that it is symbiotic and dynamic as well.  
 
Fourth, since the self is a locus of relations, each unique self arises from what a 
person does differently in different contexts. In my ecological connectedness with the 
world, I shape and are shaped by my relationships with the world. For instance, I would 
say that what I am is typically defined by my relationships with my family, i.e., I am a 
wife to my husband, a daughter to my parents, and a sister to my brothers; my 
relationship with the university, i.e., I am a post-graduate student; my relationship with 
the community, i.e., I am an intermittent church-goer, etc. -- the list goes on. While I may 
not be a unique, autonomous and discrete individual in the Western sense, nevertheless, I 
am still unique in that I assume different roles, and do different things in different 
contexts – sometimes I take on the role of a wife and other times I take on the role of a 
  18 
student. Therefore, my uniqueness and particularity arise from the flux of, and the 
symbiotic nature of the many relationships I find myself in. Insomuch as these 
relationships cast me in different roles, my reaction to, and participation in these roles 
also make me what I am. 
 
The central philosophical significance of Ames’ account is this: Within the 
Chinese context, the relational nature of human relationships is such that all things are 
interdependent and mutually entailing, existing in a state of flux. More important, the 
dynamic structure underpinning the relatedness of the human experience necessitates the 
recognition of the particularity these relationships engender. It is to Ames’ credit that his 
view of the self (which is produced by our interactions with the universe) manages to 
account for the uniqueness and particularity of these relationships. By shifting the focus 
to an individual’s particular relationships with the others, Ames no longer has to worry 
about the concept of the particular individual that is frequently discussed in relation to the 
construal of his xing in essentialist terms. Since the individual is invariably connected to 
the universe, the idea of his innate endowment or particular traits embedded within his 
essential nature does not really matter. That being the case, how would Ames construe 
xing? The next logical step for Ames is to re-construct the common understanding of xing 
as the essential nature of an individual. To find out how he does so, we must examine his 
account of xing that is seen as arising from the relatedness of our experiences.  
  19 
Xing 性  as initial conditions for cultivated human experience 
 
Ames’ view of xing that is connected to his understanding of the relational self is derived 
primarily from his interpretation of the Mencian conception of xing.30 Ames believes that 
xing is embedded in human experiences belonging to an interrelated network of 
relationships. He agrees with Tang Junyi’s account that the xing of a human being is 
defined in terms of its ongoing relations with its environment.31 On this view, we do not 
have an essential identity that arises from a heavenly-endowed xing; there are no intrinsic 
qualities of xing that reveal a particular self that exists apart from its environment. But 
what we do have are unique particulars produced by the changing functions and 
relationships of various contexts.32  
 
One significant feature of xing is to harness the unique particulars of the changing 
contexts for the purpose of self-development. On the basis of a symbiotic and 
collaborative relationship between xing and context, xing is defined as the initial 
conditions that situate us within a context, to be accompanied by a process of growth and 
nurture. Therefore Ames concludes that what is ‘innate’ in xing is the “propensity for 
growth, cultivation and refinement.”33  In this respect, a person is not described by “what 
he is,” constituted by a xing that is gifted by Heaven (tian天). In his work, Ames 
constantly describes a person by “what he does and achieves” as a relationally constituted 
                                                
30 Please see “Introduction,” n19 of this thesis. Ames believes that the Chinese tradition is largely 
influenced by the Mencian conception of xing as relational. Therefore, the analysis of xing here pertains to 
his discussion on the Mencian notion of xing. 
31 Ames, Confucian Role Ethics, 44-50. 
32 This is based on an understanding of Chinese cosmology that depicts the interdependence of the ever-
changing myriad things in the universe.  
33 Ames, Confucian Role Ethics, 1. 
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“human becoming.”34 Since the contextualized and relational person derives not from the 
intrinsic qualities of the individual but from his collateral roles and relationships, there is 
really no distinction between xing and human conduct.35  
 
 
Xing 性 as change, perpetuating growth and efficacious living 
 
If xing is defined in terms of mutually entailing relationships with the world, it becomes a 
function of the ever-changing events of the universe. This means I have no fixed xing, so 
the basic characteristic of my xing must be my “transformatory” response to what I 
encounter in every situation. Thus the defining feature of xing must be “change.” Because 
my contexts in the world are changing all the time, my xing (which is dependent on what 
I do in these contexts) is defined by the “indeterminate possibility for creative change.”36  
 
Further, since Ames maintains that there are no pre-social conditions of xing that 
are inborn, xing is “native and incipient as the initial relational conditions that bind us 
into our families. But they [xing conditions] are only the largely dependent beginnings of 
associated living, and need to be grown to make us full, active participants in family and 
community.”37 According to this claim, xing is therefore not located within the abstracted 
individual but within the concrete familial or cultural context. From this perspective, xing 
                                                
34 Ames, Confucian Role Ethics, 52. 
35 Ibid., 59. According to Ames, such a view of human nature is shared by Tang Junyi, John Dewey and 
Hans-Georg Gadamer. 
36 Ibid., 1. 
37 Ibid., 60. 
  21 
is also considered variable, highly dependent on the quality of the family or culture that a 
person is born into.38  
 
On this view, the principle of uniqueness has nothing to do with an individuated 
person. Rather, uniqueness is a “qualitatively achieved distinctiveness in the 
configuration of one’s relations within family and community…, we are not individuals 
who associate in community, but rather because we associate effectively in community 
we become distinguished as individuals.”39 This means Ames prefers to view xing as 
“achievement-inclined,” one that is always socially conditioned by a person’s 
environment.40 We grow ourselves through an extension of these relations within a social 
organization. By living my life effectively and meaningfully within a community, I will 
be able to contribute to the meaning of the world at large. For example, my xing does not 
possess the inborn quality of kindness that is endowed by Heaven. Rather, it is because of 
my involvement, for example, in the poverty campaigns of Oxfam, (and depending on 
how I perform in that involvement,) that distinguishes me as a person who contributes 
effectively to the flourishing of society.  
 
Seen in this light, my self-development has a societal orientation that adds to the 
thriving of the community. “The Confucian project, then, is to incorporate inchoate yet 
organically interdependent persons within the family nexus and transform them into 
                                                
38Ames, Confucian Role Ethics, 62. This prompts Ames to remark that feral children will be considered 
disconnected and dislocated “human beings.”  
39 Ibid., 41. 
40 Bloom, “Mencian Arguments on Human Nature,” 27. 
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eager participants in a flourishing, spiritual community.”41 From this, Ames contends that 
xing is expressed in the quality of its interactions with the others. It is constantly seeking 
out better interactions as it revises itself constantly. Thus, his view is in tune with Tang’s 
statement that “it is only in growth that it [a thing] has xing.”42 
 
 
Xing 性 and qing 情 
 
How does a concept like “human emotions” qing 情 relate to xing in Ames’ account of 
the relational self? It appears that xing and qing are dependent on a synergistic 
relationship between the self and its environment. Ames holds that if xing is closely 
related to self-development and growth in the face of the changing circumstances of the 
world, then xing will also be characterized by the “natural tendencies and unfolding 
circumstances” xingqing 性情 that are collateral and that inform each other.43 From this 
perspective, qing is both the fact (the circumstances of what something is in that context) 
[qingkuang 情況] as well as the feeling (that responds to the situation) [ganqing 感情], 
both of which are mutually entailing. Therefore Ames says, 
 
Who someone really is (qing 情), for example, is determined by the 
qualitative growth in the extensiveness (zhida 至大) and the intensiveness 
(zhigang 至刚) of their initial conditions (xing 性).44 
 
                                                
41 Ames, Confucian Role Ethics, 61. 
42 Ibid., 45. This has to do with the recognition that xing would defer to the de德of things which is the 
intrinsic excellence of all things. 
43 Ibid., 40. 
44 Ibid. 
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In other words, qing results from the self’s interactions with the others in 
various circumstances. If xing is embedded in the contextual pattern of relations, then 
qing too is embedded in the contextual pattern of relations. Qing is both the ‘factual’ 
and ‘affective’ part of the situation that is dependent on a collaborative relationship 
between the self and contexts. 
 
In short, Ames presents a far more dynamic conception of xing that rejects the 
idea that we are just passive receptacles of changes in an interdependent environment. 
While he seeks to emphasize the determining influence of changing roles and 
relationships on selfhood, he does not deny the self of its creative co-authorship in 
these situations. Since the myriad things exist in a changing state of growth, the 
mutability of the changing particulars simply denotes that the self gets renegotiated, 
and contributes its uniqueness and particularity to the different situations it is in.  
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Philosophical implications of a relational conception of self 
 
In the main, Ames develops his view of the relational self against Western theories that 
portray the self as a unitary construct of irreducibility and superordination. For him, the 
self in Chinese philosophy is not conceived as the centre of power, consciousness and 
action. Rather, the self is relational – it is the focal point and centre of relationships in an 
open system, constituting and being constituted by the various contexts it is in. This 
means that Ames’ view is predominantly opposed to an essentialist conception of self 
that locates selfhood in a person. As long as I am conceived as a locus of relations, my 
personal identity is constituted by my various role fulfillments in this matrix of 
relationships. Since my role fulfillments are integral to the evolving meaning of my 
“self,” I am what I am by virtue of this network of relationships. In this sense, my 
selfhood is not something that is imparted or controlled by a transcendental being, 
substance or principle. Ames’ theory as such rejects the idea of an individual with an 
essential nature, and devalues the inner traits of the individual that is independent of 
relations.  
 
To get a clearer understanding of Ames’ opposition to an essentialist 
interpretation of self, we need to look at his work with Henry Rosemont on family 
reverence and role ethics in Confucianism. In The Chinese Classic of Family Reverence: 
A Philosophical Translation of the Xiaojing, Ames and Rosemont argue for a theory of 
moral principles without having to resort to the idea of the discrete and “individual” 
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self.45 Here, I call attention to their discussion because it has important implications for 
why an essentialist understanding of selfhood (as located in the xing of an individual) is 
opposed to relations. Ames and Rosemont reject an essentialist interpretation of xing 
belonging to “discrete entities defined by common traits,” suggesting that it refutes the 
relational understanding of self central to role ethics: 
 
In a Confucian world, because persons are born into family relations that 
are considered constitutive of their person, their “natures” (xing 性), or 
perhaps better, “natural tendencies,” are a combination of native instinct 
and the cultivated cognitive, moral, aesthetic, religious sensibilities 
provided by their family locus and initial conditions. That is, persons from 
their inchoate beginnings are to be understood as embedded in and 
nurtured by unique, transactional patterns of relations rather than as 
discrete entities defined by common traits.46 
 
 
The classic essentialist interpretation (that is commonly associated with 
Aristotle’s virtue ethics) holds that human beings are born with certain biological and 
metaphysical uniformities – therefore, human actualization is dependent on the 
actualization of this given potential that is common to humans.47 According to Ames and 
Rosemont, the problem with such an essentialist construal of xing is that humans become 
defined by universal qualities that are grounded in some abstract entity, principle or 
essence. They decry such an endeavor, insisting that, 
 
                                                
45 Henry Rosemont Jr., “Whose Democracy? Which Rights? A Confucian Critique of Modern Western 
Liberalism,” in Confucian Ethics: A Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy, and Community, eds. David B. 
Wong and Shun Kwong-Loi (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 49-71. Rosemont 
would formulate the arguments further by applying role ethics to the issue of human rights in political 
theories.  
46 Ames and Rosemont, Chinese Classic of Family Reverence, 41. 
47 Ibid. 
  26 
Just as we might be skeptical of positing the existence of some ontological 
ground – God, substance, and so on – so too can we question whether we 
need to posit an individual self (nature, soul, person, character) behind the 
many roles we live.48 
 
 
For them, human development does not refer to the actualization of some abstract, 
universal qualities that are found in a person. Rather, it is an achievement that is 
expressed in the quality of one’s relationships with the others. The defining importance of 
role ethics lies in capturing the particularity and nuances of an individual’s actions in the 
various contexts without subjugating them to the abstract dispositions of an “individual 
self.” Characterizing xing by the biological traits of a person as an innate endowment that 
is common to mankind undermines the idea of xing as an achievement concept. For Ames 
and Rosemont, xing as a form of human capacity is not fixed at birth; rather, it is 
embedded in, and nurtured by human experiences. Therefore human beings are better 
construed as “human becomings” whereby the focus is not on what they are born with, 
but what they achieve in life.  
 
The most crucial point that can be gleaned from the discussion is this: Ames and 
Rosemont are opposed to moral theories that are based on the understanding of xing in 
essentialist terms, simply because morality becomes dependent on the cultivation of 
abstract moral qualities, dispositions or principles. Admittedly, appealing to abstract 
universals to prescribe moral standards does not take into account that “moral judgment 
                                                
48 Ames and Rosemont, Chinese Classic of Family Reverence, 45. 
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is ineliminably bound to particular contexts in which matters of perception, judgment, 
individual relations, etc. play roles that cannot be captured by general principles.”49  
 
Consequently, Ames and Rosemont argue for a role ethics that views xing as 
appropriate conduct. They construe xing as fundamentally normative – by expressing 
one’s xing, one is expressing proper conduct, not some abstract uniformities that are 
inborn:50  
 
For this reason, Confucian terms such as ren 仁 and de 德 – 
“consummatory conduct” and “excellence” respectively – far from being 
uniformities, are generalizations drawn from the life histories of particular 
persons, and are thus often illustrated by appealing to particular models of 
conduct rather than by invoking abstract principles or definitions.51  
 
 
In so doing, xing as proper conduct is able to ground the normative force of a 
moral theory better than ethics based on an essentialist understanding that appeals to 
abstract universals. In addition, role ethics precludes moral conflict because appropriate 
conduct is always based on the collaborative nature of relationships.52  
 
In short, Ames and Rosemont believe that the universalism that is complicit with 
an essentialist interpretation of xing cannot accommodate the particularity and uniqueness 
of the nature of our relationships with others. Their construal of the relational self and 
                                                
49 Jay Garfield, “Particularity and Principle: The Structure of Moral Knowledge,” in Moral Particularism, 
eds. Brad Hooker and Margaret Little (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 179. 
50 Ames, “The Mencian Conception of Ren xing,” 157. 
51 Ames and Rosemont, Chinese Classic of Family Reverence, 42. 
52 Ibid., 45. 
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their opposition to the essentialist conception of self advance a new perspective for 
understanding Chinese philosophy. However, is this the only way to convey the 
relatedness of the human experience? At a broader level, two questions bother me. First, 
even if we were to grant that classical Chinese thinking privileges relations, what about 
the other schools of thought within the Chinese intellectual tradition? Is it necessarily the 
case that the entire range of Chinese thought places a premium on the relatedness of the 
human experience?  Second, is it really true that it is impossible to have an essentialist 
understanding of self, without undermining the role relations plays in human 
experiences? To put it in another way, within the Chinese context, is it not possible to 
understand xing in essentialist terms, while doing full justice to the relatedness of the 
human experience?  
  
To the extent that it is beyond the scope of this thesis to investigate the first 
question, we should just keep this question in mind while I take on the more modest task 
of focusing on the second question that I have raised. With respect to that, my research 
has shown that we can find an alternative account of the self in an important aspect of 
Wei-Jin thought, revealing notions of inner subjectivity, uniqueness and irreducibility in 
a self that “receives” its xing from Dao. Expressed primarily by Guo Xiang, this is an 
essentialist view that locates selfhood in the xing-core of an individual without 
necessarily denying the particularity of his relations with the others in an environment of 
interrelatedness.  
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In my opinion, such an interpretation manages to fuse an essentialist notion of self 
with an understanding of the relational nature of human experience. Clearly, this 
challenges us to re-evaluate Ames’ approach. More important, it helps to answer the 
second question that I have raised, namely, whether an essentialist interpretation of self is 
necessarily opposed to the interdependent character of human development. The main 
purpose of the subsequent two chapters of this thesis is to uncover this conception of self. 
 
A full appreciation of this Wei-Jin sense of self can only be achieved by 
examining the socio-political and intellectual environment that helped shape such an 
understanding of self. To that end, the next chapter of this thesis is dedicated to exploring 
the historical context and intellectual tradition in which Guo Xiang’s commentary on the 
Zhuangzi is situated. Let us now turn to that. 








The Wei-Jin historical setting 
 
Rise of neo-Daoism 
 
A comprehensive study of the Wei-Jin 魏晋 notion of self must begin with a study of the 
historical background that details the socio-political conditions of the period. The Wei-Jin 
epoch (220-420) of China’s history saw the disintegration of central authority with the 
collapse of the Han orthodoxy and its socio-political structure.53 Subsequently, Wei-Jin 
China became engulfed in feudalism as many parts of the country were controlled by 
powerful local clans and aristocratic families. The shift of power effected profound 
changes in the ideological realm, as Han Confucianism finally gave way to new currents 
of thought.54 During this time of disunity, social upheavals, political persecutions, 
corruption and incompetence were rife. The traditional Confucian values that the 
ineffectual Han dynasty espoused no longer held any meaning for the Wei-Jin 
intelligentsia. As a consequence, these Wei-Jin thinkers tried to liberate themselves from 
                                                
53 The Wei-Jin period can be divided into the Wei dynasty (220-265), Western Jin dynasty (265-317) and 
Eastern Jin dynasty (317-420) during which the Jin court is moved to the south in 317. 
54 Li Ze-hou, in Path of Beauty: A Study of Chinese Aesthetics, trans. Gong Li-zeng (Hong Kong; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 120. The Han dynasty had previously achieved the unification of 
ideology through Emperor Wudi of Western Han. According to Li, all the pre-Qin schools of Logicians, 
Legalists and Daoists (with the exception of Confucianism) were suppressed for centuries by the decree 
that this Emperor had issued. 
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the prevailing ideology of Confucianism by revolting against the values of the Confucian 
tradition. The course of China’s intellectual history during this period is aptly summed up 
by Fung Yu-lan’s observation in A History of Chinese Philosophy: 
 
It is only when the environment undergoes great changes, so that the old 
ways of thought are no longer able to respond to the trends of the time, 
that new types of thought develop to the point that they can no longer be 
contained in the old bottles. Thereupon, the old bottles are shattered and 
new bottles are set up to take their place.55  
 
 
The Wei-Jin upheaval accomplished a golden era of philosophical ruminations 
and doctrines based on the revival of Daoism. Accompanying the “shattering” of the 
Han-Confucian ideals was a flourishing of neo-Daoist ideologies that asked probing 
questions about the place of man in the world. As an ideology, neo-Daoism is complex 
and consists of varied responses to the challenges posed by the turmoil of the Han 
period.56 We are reminded of Alan Chan’s comment that neo-Daoism during this period 
is distinguished by its broadness in its “attempt to discern the perceived true meaning of 
the Dao, … it does not name a homogenous or partisan ‘Daoist’ school.”57  
 
Notwithstanding the revolt against Han-Confucianism, the Wei-Jin critique does 
not necessarily imply the rejection of Confucius’ thought. As Chan points out, 
“(v)irtually everyone agreed that Confucius was the highest sage. The problem, rather, 
                                                
55 Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy: Volume II, The Period of Classical Learning (from the 
Second Century B.C. to the Twentieth Century A.D.), trans. Derk Bodde (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1952), 6. 
56 Chan, “Neo Daoism,” 1-4. Chan argues that an important feature of neo-Daoism is the broadness and 
diversity of thought in the intellectuals’ attempts to re-interpret the classical Confucian and Daoist works. 
57 Ibid., 1. 
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has to do with the perceived misunderstanding and misappropriation of Confucian 
teachings.”58 More likely, neo-Daoism in the Wei-Jin context represents a fit of 
intellectual rage against the perceived “misinterpretation” of classical Confucian and 
Daoist works that tend to skew towards conformism. This revelation is not surprising, 
considering that this movement is often characterized by a radical construal of the 
classical texts that strongly emphasizes freedom.  
 
The change in the Wei-Jin intellectual inclinations was especially apparent during 
the Zhengshi 正始 reign (240-249). This was a period whereby the “debris of Confucian 
ritualism has to be cleared away and room made for new values of ‘Naturalness’ (tzu-jan 
自然) [ziran] and ‘Non-actuality’ (wu 无).”59 A group of intellectuals led by Wang Bi 
王弼 (226-249) and He Yan 何晏 (d.249) established the Abstruse Learning (Xuanxue  
玄学) that was based on the teachings of Laozi 老子, Zhuangzi 庄子 and the Yijing 易经. 
New theories promoting human liberation and the affirmation of the inner self (over and 
above the tyrannies of the corrupted society) were produced. The Confucian ritualism 
that resulted from the strict conformity to ritualistic codes was now deemed to be 
unnatural and meaningless.60 Ultimately, Wang Bi and He Yan were reacting against the 
Han-Confucian orthodoxy that subsumed the self under a blanket of ritualistic norms. 
They were not necessarily anti-Confucius, even though their terminology was 
“unmistakably Taoist [Daoist].”61 It was not until one generation later that their ideas 
                                                
58 Chan, “Neo Daoism,” 4. 
59 Richard B. Mather, “The Controversy over Conformity and Naturalness during the Six Dynasties,” 
History of Religions, Vol. 9, no. 2/3 (Nov. 1969-Feb. 1970):161. 
60 Ibid., 162-164. 
61 Mather, “Controversy over Conformity and Naturalness,” 165. 
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influenced and led to the development of the Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove (Zhulin 
qixian 竹林七贤) which promulgated Xuanxue into a counter-revolution against 
Confucian morality. Notably, members of Zhulin qixian such as Ji Kang 嵇康 (223-262), 
Xiang Xiu 向秀 (227-280), Guo Xiang 郭象 (d. 312) and Ruan Ji 阮籍 (210-263) would 
appropriate creatively from the classical Daoist texts to support their views on the 
emancipation of man.  
 
In their step back into the past to confront the present, these Wei-Jin intellectuals 
were highly attracted to the teachings of Zhuangzi. This is probably because the emphasis 
of this classical text tends to be quite unusual. No one stresses the importance of the 
individual as much as Zhuangzi does – he advocates detachment from secular concerns, 
firmly upholding the independence and freedom of the human being. As an anti-
conformist, Zhuangzi shows no respect for those who act in accordance to norms and not 
their own natures.62 He is primarily concerned with the individual’s relationship with the 
universe, not the social-political issues of the day. Therefore, he envisions the 
consummate human ideal, the sage, as one who embodies spirituality and insight through 
his integration with the myriad things in the cosmos.  
 
Conceivably, Zhuangzi’s philosophy inspired the Wei-Jin intellectuals, who 
would then turn away from their turbulent times to seek refuge in the ideals espoused by 
him. It is my contention here that although there is no united front in their approach to the 
Zhuangzi, a particular group of neo-Daoists would interpret aspects of the text to produce 
                                                
62 Mather, “Controversy over Conformity and Naturalness,” 162. 
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a fairly comprehensive philosophical account of the self.63 Such a particular mode of 
appropriation would form an important trend of the Wei-Jin thought that uses the 
Zhuangzi as a significant source of inspiration for a notion of self that preserves its xing-
core in the ecological interconnectedness of the universe.64 This strand of thought is 
predominantly embraced by Guo Xiang’s commentary on the Zhuangzi. 
 
 
Individualism – anti-conformism and naturalness 
 
In the main, the writings of these neo-Daoists reflect the collective cry for more human 
diversity. The general climate of anti-conformism fostered a heightened perception of the 
true self and naturalness, dictating that one’s personality was to be valued and cultivated 
for its own sake. Yü Ying-shih notes in his paper, 
 
The search for the authentic self gradually led to the emergence of a type 
of personality which, to borrow Burckhardt’s phrase, neither “knew of 
false modesty or hypocrisy,” nor was afraid of singularity, of being unlike 
others… By the end of the Han dynasty, singularity (i) had become a 
positive value. A personality would be favourably judged precisely 
because it was singular, different or extraordinary. On the other hand, the 
idea of identity, or sameness (t’ung), was held in contempt.65 
 
 
                                                
63 This is not to say that all the Wei-Jin intellectuals interpret the Zhuangzi in the same way. This thesis is 
focused on this particular interpretation of the Zhuangzi that harmonizes xing-core with the interrelatedness 
of the universe. 
64 As this thesis is focused on a particular notion of self that is derived from the Zhuangzi, we are leaving 
aside the contributions of the Daodejing and Yijing to the conception of self during the Wei-Jin period. 
65 Yü Ying-shih, “Individualism and the Neo-Taoist Movement,” in Individualism and Holism, 125-6. 
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 Mostly, this Wei-Jin cult of individualism takes expression in the relationship 
between the individual and the socio-political order. The Zhulin qixian like Ruan Ji, Ji 
Kang and others would seek to display contempt and scorn on Confucian norms and 
conventionality in two ways – their works and deeds. In their works, these intellectuals 
produced extensive writings questioning the validity of Confucian ethics. Evidently, they 
no longer believed in subscribing to a totalistic system of artificial norms and outmoded 
rituals that did not reflect the true order of Dao. Guo Xiang would join the ranks of these 
individualists in their broadside against Confucian ritualism in his commentary on the 
Zhuangzi.66 In Chapter Six of the Zhuangzi where Zigong chides his friends for singing in 
the presence of Master Sanghu’s corpse, Guo Xiang declares his view on the factitious 





One who understands the real meaning of propriety must attend to worldly 
conventions [jingnei 经内] only from the perspective of wandering 
beyond worldly conventions [youwai 游外] and by preserving the child by 
holding fast to the mother. Such a one is equal to his natural inclinations 
[chenqing 称情] and simply goes out and does it.  But as for those who 
take pride in reputation and let themselves be led by form and appearance, 
for them filial piety [xiao 孝] proceeds not out of commitment to sincerity, 
and paternal compassion [ci 慈] proceeds not from honesty, so fathers and 
sons and older and younger brothers keep their true feelings hidden and 
bully and deceive one another—what does this have to do with the 
meaning of propriety in the large sense of the word!67 
                                                
66 Some scholars (Fung Yu-lan and Brook Ziporyn for instance) hold the view that Guo Xiang appropriates 
“creatively” from the Zhuangzi to fit his attempt of fusing Confucianist and Daoist thought. Therefore, with 
respect to his views on the socio-political structure that was held in scorn during his time, Guo Xiang often 
rebukes the objectified institutions without having anything negative to say about its creators. Cf. Fung, A 
History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. II, 206-236 and Brook Ziporyn, The Penumbra Unbound: The Neo-
Taoist Philosophy of Guo Xiang (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2003), 31-50. 
67 Richard John Lynn, Zhuangzi: A New Translation of the Sayings of Master Zhuang As Interpreted By 
Guo Xiang (New York: Columbia University Press, forthcoming), 157-158. 
  36 
Guo Xiang reflects the general sentiment of these neo-Daoists when they charge 
that the Confucian system of rituals is arcane and contrived, no longer expressing the 
“true feelings” qing 情 of man. Evidently, the conformism of the Confucian ritualistic 
society is regarded as diametrically opposed to naturalness, the “natural inclinations” 
chengqing 称情 and the true feelings of man.68 Such a conflict is expressed by Ji Kang 
here: 
 
The emphasis of the Six Classics is placed mainly on repression whereas 
human nature experiences joy in the following of desires. Repression goes 
against a man’s inclinations; he attains to naturalness by following his 
desires. Therefore it follows that attainment of naturalness does not come 
from the repressive Six Classics and preservation of man’s nature does not 
need a base in rituals and laws which run counter to feelings.69 
 
 
The defiance that marks the work of these thinkers is also manifested in their 
beatnik behaviour. Richard Mather recounts how the individualism of these neo-Daoists 
is characterized by the extent of their refusal to bend to social and political pressures, 
resulting in the proliferation of unconventional and eccentric characters who flout 
                                                
68 Mather, “Controversy over Conformity and Naturalness,” 166-168. Ideologically, the conflict was 
between two schools of thought, the school of Mingjiao 名教 and the school of Ziran 自然. See also Chan, 
“Neo Daoism,” 32. Chan believes there are a variety of views on qing although most of the Wei-Jin 
intellectuals seem to agree that a strong display of qing reflects naturalness and authenticity. Here I quote 
Chan: 
Ji Kang looks to dispassion as an ethical ideal, … and Xiang Xiu responded that passion 
must be placed under strict control by ritual norms and conduct. Notwithstanding the 
plurality of views on this issue, many scholars during the Wei-Jin era have come to 
appreciate strong emotion as a sign of authenticity. 
69 Tai Ming-yang, Hsi K’ang chi chiao-chu [Collected works of Hsi K’ang, with collations and annotations] 
(Peking: Jen-min Wen-hsüeh Ch’u-pan She, 1962), 171, This passage is translated by Yü, “Individualism 
and Neo-Taoist Movement,” 140. 
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Confucian morality openly.70 For example, the Shishuo xinyu 世说新语 records how the 
Zhulin qixian would react against the repressive society by discarding inhibitions and 
freeing their inner passions, indulging in an overt display of feelings in their conduct.71 
Ruan Ji’s open display of grief and the drunken manner in which he mourned for the 
death of his mother attest to his contempt for the hypocrisy surrounding the sham of 
ritualism72: “When out in the world talk loudly of purity and uprightness, but behind their 
doors virtue and cultivation are sadly diminished… Bending and bowing correctly at 
every turn; their bearing and manner bring a pain in my bowels.”73  
 
The individualism that culminates in this fascinating display of outré behavior 
forms one significant facet of the Wei-Jin search for the true self and naturalness.74 
Besides expressing the stance of anti-conformism, such liberating behavior is often seen 
as expressing true feelings signifying the true order of things. Consequently, the 
                                                
70 Richard B. Mather, “Individualistic Expressions of the Outsiders,” in Individualism and Holism, 200-
204. Mather believes that although the individualists challenged the social norms, they did not challenge 
the hierarchical view of the society with its built-in network of mutual obligation.  
71 Liu I-ch’ing, with commentary by Liu Chu in A New Account of Tales of the World (Shi-shuo Hsin-yu), 
trans. Richard B. Mather (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1976). 
72 Hsiao Kung-chuan, in F. W. Mote trans., History of Chinese Political Thought (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1979), 635-6. Ruan Ji’s “bizarre” reaction that is unbecoming of ritualistic standards is 
described as follows: 
Juan Chi [Ruan Ji] attended his mother in particularly filial devotion. When his mother 
died, he was in the midst of a chess game with a friend “whom he retained in order to 
finish the match. After that he drank two liters of wine, cried a loud cry, and vomited 
several cups of blood. When the time came for her burial, Juan Chi ate steamed dried 
meat [meat being inappropriate to mourning], drank two liters of wine, after which he 
went to speak his parting words to her. He simply said, “How grievous”, then, raising his 
voice, he let out a loud cry, and again spit up several cups of blood. Grief so consumed 
him that he became emaciated and was on the point of extinguishing his life. P’ei K’ai 
went to condole with Juan Chi and found him, hair unkempt, squatting on the floor, 
drunk, and staring blankly… 
73 Ibid., 637. 
74 This is not to maintain that all the neo-Daoists of the period express themselves in the same unbridled 
manner in their search for the true self. Some have also turned to inwardness, seeking to hide their 
emotions. This goes back to my earlier point that neo-Daoism is hardly uniform in its expression and 
thought. 
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individualists of the Wei-Jin period are regarded as renegades in their defiance of 
conventional norms and standards, free spirits in their engagement of absolute freedom in 
their behavior.75 (Again, the important point to note is that this is only a certain aspect of 
the Wei-Jin individualism that is defined in terms of an open display of true feelings and 
a wanton disregard for Confucian rituals.76) For the purpose of this thesis, our task is to 
evince the philosophical basis of this mode of Wei-Jin individualism. This means we 
must uncover the view of self and human nature (xing 性) that lies behind such a posture 
of individualism. For one, the belief in the inviolability of one’s xing that makes up one’s 
“self” would form the cornerstone of this Wei-Jin cult of individualism. Interestingly, this 
notion of self also involves a sense of self-forgetting that seems to belie the very 
individualism embodied in Wei-Jin thinking and behavior (that is described here). 
 
At this point, we must refer to Mather’s observation that in essence, these Wei-Jin 
intellectuals accept the mainstream view of a universe that consists of interrelated entities 
– harmony in such a system issues from each part finding its place within the hierarchical 
whole.77 This goes back to the observation of Hall and Ames that classical Chinese 
philosophy has always employed the language of interdependence. So while these neo-
Daoists seek to meet the needs and desires for human subjectivity, they never question 
the belief that all things in the universe are interdependent and mutually entailing. In the 
relationship between the self and the others, they believe that the self must embark on a 
process of self-forgetting that relinquishes all differences to achieve true freedom. The 
                                                
75 Mather, “Individualistic Expressions of the Outsiders,” 200-205. 
76 In order to understand the Wei-Jin idea of self as harmonizing xing-core and interrelatedness, this thesis 
is extracting and highlighting this particular mode of individualism that focuses on an overt display of 
feelings for discussion. 
77 Mather, “Individualistic Expressions of the Outsiders,” 199. 
  39 
conundrum is that the exclusivity and subjectivity of the self cannot preclude the 
inclusivity and mutual interaction of all things in the universe. The challenge is then to 
search for a perfect solution to self-determination in a cosmological system marked by 
interdependence and indeterminacy of all things. A particular group of Wei-Jin 
intellectuals would find their answer in the appropriation of Zhuangzi’s doctrine, 
promoting a somewhat unusual view of the self that harmonizes the xing-core of an 
individual with the interrelatedness of his environment.  
 
The most prominent expression of this view belongs to the work of Guo Xiang 
that is made available to us by his commentary to the Zhuangzi. In order to examine the 
basis of Guo Xiang’s work, we must first comprehend what Guo Xiang means by the 
xing-core of an individual. For this, we need to turn to the next section that examines the 
discussion on xing in early China, starting from the debate between Mencius 孟子 (372-
289 B.C.), Gaozi 告子(420-350 B.C.) and Xunzi 荀子(312-230 B.C.).  
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The early debate on xing 性 , qing 情  and sagehood 
 
Understanding of xing 性 in the early Chinese context 
 
To put Guo Xiang’s view on xing in perspective, one needs to foreground the discussion 
with an understanding of xing in classical Chinese thought. There are four important 
points that are worth noting here. First, most modern scholars agree that the meaning of 
xing is derived from the concept of sheng 生  (to give birth to, life and growth).78 In this 
sense, xing means the life or general direction of growth of a thing; life is also perceived 
to be issuing from Heaven (tian 天), or forming part of the natural order.79  
 
Second, with regard to the interpretation of xing, it is commonly thought that xing 
is constituted by qi 气. Qi is the vital energy that permeates the cosmos. It is also seen as 
the source and sustenance of life. From this perspective, what a person is depends on the 
qi that he receives from tian, and ultimately, Dao.80 For instance, Shun Kwong-loi points 
out that the Guanzi 管子 construes xing in terms of qi, and proposes nourishing qi by 
                                                
78 Shun Kwong-loi, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 
1997), 37. See also Alan K.L. Chan “Two Ethical Perspectives on the Emotions in the Zhuangzi,” in 
Zhuangzi: Ethics at Ease, eds. Dennis Schilling and Richard King (Munich: Harrasowitz, forthcoming 
2009), 5. 
79 Chan, “Two Ethical Perspectives,” 5; and Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 15 & 209. This 
point is related to how tian is conceived in the early texts. According to Shun, the early usage of tian shows 
that it is thought to be responsible for natural phenomena and it exercises control over human affairs. But 
tian can also be conceived as a personal deity or impersonal natural order. It does not serve the purpose of 
this thesis to belabour this point. 
80 Alan K.L. Chan, “The Nature of the Sage and the Emotions: A Debate in Wei-Jin Philosophy Revisited,” 
Journal for Chinese Philosophy and Culture 2 (2007): 198. The terms tian and Dao have many different 
interpretations as I have highlighted in n79 above. I will sidestep the interpretational issues and take Chan’s 
reading of Dao as understood in terms of qi, and that qi determines a person’s xing. 
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quieting the heart-mind (xin 心).81 Based on findings in the Zuozhuan 左传, A.C. Graham 
also suggests that xing comprises the proper balance of the six qi (yin and yang 阴阳, 
wind and rain, light and dark) that is generated inside us by the heaven and earth.82  
 
Third, if xing is constituted by qi, then xing translates into inborn human capacity 
(cai 才). Mencius not only recognizes cai as the inborn human potential, he also uses 
xing to refer to the course of development for this potential to be fully realized in a 
healthy environment.83 Here, Chan observes that as the content of xing, cai refers broadly 
to “physical endowment, intelligence, moral capacity and emotive competence.”84 
 
Fourth, in the early Chinese texts, the concept of xing is closely related to the idea 
of qing 情.85 The term qing does not refer to a single meaning – it covers a broad 
semantic range from the basic inclinations to the fundamental qualities of human 
beings.86 For instance, according to Chan, Xunzi defines qing as the substance of xing.87 
The usage of qing in the early texts also leads to the general consensus among scholars 
(like Graham, Shun and Chad Hansen) that the notion of qing usually refers to the 
                                                
81 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 192.  
82 A .C. Graham, Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature (Singapore: Institute of East 
Asian Philosophies, National University of Singapore, 1986), 15. 
83 Bryan W. Van Norden, Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 214-5 
84 Chan, “Two Ethical Perspectives,” 6. 
85 Ning Chen, “The Ideological Background of the Mencian Discussion of Human Nature: A 
Reexamination,” in Mencius: Contexts and Interpretations, ed. Alan K.L. Chan (Honolulu: University of 
Hawai‘i Press, 2002), 28-31. 
86 Michael Puett, “The Ethics of Responding Properly: The Notion of Qing情in Early Chinese Thought,” in 
Love and Emotions in Traditional Chinese Literature, ed. Halvor Eifring, (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 
2004), 42. For a good account of the meanings of qing, please see Christoph Harbsmeier, “The Semantics 
of Qing 情in Pre-Buddhist Thought,” in Love and Emotions, 69-148. 
87 Chan, “Two Ethical Perspectives,” 7. 
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characteristic features of what something or a situation is genuinely like.88 In view of this, 
qing is related to xing in that the former reveals or emphasizes the content of the latter; 
while qing is hard to alter, xing can be nourished or harmed.89  
 
Halvor Eifring also observes that qing is initially referred to as the substance of 
man’s nature, the “basic instincts” that consist of his emotional reactions to 
circumstances.90 However, at a later period, qing underwent a “semantic specialization,” 
and came to denote emotions that are not directly connected to the idea of xing as basic 
instincts – rather, qing became related to shifei 是非, the cognitive excesses of the heart-
mind (xin 心).91  (I will cover this point in greater detail later when I discuss Guo Xiang’s 
thought.) Here, Eifring’s observation about qing will prove to be useful in understanding 
the early philosophical exchanges on the relation between xing and qing: (1) Qing refers 
to a person’s affective capacities that are expressed spontaneously and differently upon 
interaction with phenomena92; and (2) qing is also seen to have its basis in cognition. This 
                                                
88 A.C. Graham, “The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature,” 7-66; Chad Hansen, “Qing 
(Emotions) in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought,” 181-211, in Emotions In Asian Thought; and Shun, Mencius 
and Early Chinese Thought, 184-187. 
89 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 185-186. 
90 Halvor Eifring, “Introduction: Emotions and the Conceptual History of Qing情,” in Love and Emotions, 
12-14. 
91 In this thesis, I will be using Graham’s translation of shi (it is this) and fei (it is not) in Chuang-tzu: The 
Seven Inner Chapters and Other Writings from the book Chuang-tzu (London ; Boston : Allen & Unwin, 
1981). For more on Graham’s interpretation of shifei in the Zhuangzi, please see his essay on “Shih是/fei 
非and yu 有/wu 无in Chinese Philosophy,” in Studies in Chinese Philosophy, 331-343.  
92 Puett, “The Ethics of Responding Properly,”46-47. This understanding is taken from Puett’s translation 
of the Xing zi ming chu性自命出text from the Guodian郭店tomb. Puett claims that although qing involves 
expressing one’s nature spontaneously in different circumstances, the text does not imply that qing is 
necessarily bad. Such an observation about qing is also mentioned by Chan in “Two Ethical Perspectives,” 
7.  
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is due to the idea that the affective capacity of qing that responds to phenomena is 
directed through the cognitive activities of xin.93  
 
In short, xing in classical Chinese thought is construed as growth or life. As a 
general concept, it is understood to be constituted by qi – in this sense, when the notion 
of xing is applied to a person, it refers to his inborn capacity or cai.  Xing also comprises 
qing – as an element of xing, qing is considered to be made up of qi as well. Generally, 
qing denotes the characteristic tendencies of something. But qing also refers to the 
affective capacity of a person. When xing is moved by phenomena, the affective capacity 
of qing reacts and desire (yu 欲) results.94 These descriptions form the general 
understanding of xing in the classical Chinese texts. 
 
 
The early philosophical debate on xing 性 and qing 情 
 
Graham maintains that the topic of xing remains non-philosophical right down to the 
fourth century B.C. – it is the Nurture of Life (Yang sheng 养生) doctrine of the 
individualists, precipitated primarily by Yang Zhu 杨朱 (350 B.C.) that marks the entry 
of the term xing in philosophy.95 The Yang sheng individualists conceive xing as 
constituted by qi, and regard xing as the proper course of development for humans. They 
                                                
93 Chan, “Two Ethical Perspectives,” 7-8. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Graham, Studies in Chinese Philosophy, 13. The individualistic ideas of Yang Zhu are conceived in 
direct opposition to the Confucian and Mohist schools of thought who are seen as having neglected the 
private sphere of human existence. 
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advocate the preservation of a person’s private realm over the public domain. Therefore, 
anything that runs counter to an individual’s xing and disrupts the qi of life is bad. 
Although Yang Zhu believes in “each for himself” (weiwo 为我), this does not mean that 
he promotes egoism. Rather, the individualism of Yang Zhu signifies that a person’s life 
and health are to be preserved out of a respect for Heaven’s will that has endowed 
mankind with life. Under this school of thought, desires and longings are heavenly-
endowed, and are known as the natural and instinctive tendencies (qing 情) of an 
individual’s xing.96 The sage is one who moderates and controls his qing so that they do 
not run counter to his xing. Factors that are extrinsic to one’s xing (like involvement in 
political life or over-indulgence in sensual pleasures) are seen to be injurious to one’s 
life. In short, the Yang sheng individualists believe that xing is due to Heaven – one’s 
duty is therefore to follow one’s xing to nourish it, and not to engage in sensory 
indulgences and external possessions that harm one’s xing. 
 
Such individualist views put the Confucians in a flurry, sparking a metaphysical 
crisis underlying the debate on xing that took place chiefly between Mencius, Gaozi and 
Xunzi around the fourth century B.C. Mencius opposes Yang Zhu’s ideas on two levels. 
First, Yang Zhu’s account prescribes behavior that encourages safeguarding individuality 
and self-preservation, rather than an engagement in worldly affairs to create peace and 
harmony in society. Second, Yang Zhu’s view implies that xing (which is imparted by 
                                                
96 Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, Volume I, The Period of the Philosophers (from the 
beginnings to circa 100 B.C.), trans. Derk Bodde (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1952), 138. 
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Heaven) includes qing. Hence at a deeper level, our instinctive and heavenly-endowed 
desires/longings might possibly conflict with morality.97 
 
In defense of his belief that there is moral goodness in mankind, Mencius 
emphasizes the positive potentialities of xing that is innate in human beings. He holds 
that xing is not complete at birth, but a person’s predisposition towards goodness (that is 
endowed by Heaven) is to be cultivated in order to stimulate growth. Mencius calls our 
incipient morality the four sprouts (duan 端) of moral goodness that are located in the xin 
of humans. Shun observes that Mencius’ approach considers xing as having ethical 
attributes, constituted by the development of the ethical inclinations of xin; to nourish 
xing, xin should guide qi.98 When properly nourished, the four duan of moral goodness 
will then develop into the four main virtues: Benevolence (ren 仁), righteousness (yi 义), 
wisdom (zhi 智) and propriety (li 礼).99 For Mencius, the ethical inclinations of xin are 
due to tian, and are rooted in Dao – evil results when one fails to develop one’s potential 
in harmony with Dao.  
 
In so doing, Mencius infuses an ethical value to the concept of qi. He thus coins 
the expression flood-like qi (haoran zhi qi 浩然之气) to describe the accumulation of the 
purest essence of qi that only the true gentleman or sage can attain.100 This qi is not only 
a fundamental component of xin, it regulates the stability of xin, and is connected to the 
moral force (de 德) of the sage and Heaven itself. For Mencius, one’s moral development 
                                                
97 Bloom, “Mencian Arguments on Human Nature,” 25. 
98 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 187-188 and 192. 
99 Norden, Virtue Ethics, 40 
100 Graham, Studies in Chinese Philosophy, 29-30. 
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is conceived as the growth and development of qi. Therefore it is xin (and not the rites) 
that is recognized as the ultimate authority for moral decisions.101 Importantly, Irene 
Bloom observes that under Mencius, qing as a category of xing becomes that which is 
uniquely human. It is in terms of qing that Mencius speaks about the potential goodness 
of xing.102 
 
Mencius’ polemic on xing is also directed at Gaozi, whose differences with the 
former makes him the main opponent of Mencius’ thought. Gaozi defines xing as due to 
tian; it is neutral at birth, and is neither good nor bad. According to Maurizio Scarpari, 
xing for Gaozi can be interpreted in terms of both a “static value” (which is the raw 
material we have at birth) and a “dynamic value” (which is the natural process of growth, 
referring to what we acquire during life).103 The more significant implication of the latter 
reading is that xing can be channeled in a specific direction; it can tend towards good or 
bad. Given such a depiction of xing, morality for Gaozi is extraneous to xing. Morality is 
not inborn, neither is it immediately present at birth. Unlike Mencius’ thesis, moral 
goodness does not flow from xin for Gaozi. In fact, morality results from education and 
from internalizing rites and rituals or li 礼. This is why Mencius is particularly opposed 
to Gaozi’s delineation of xing and how it bears upon morality. Here, Mencius 
distinguishes between the budong xin 不动心 of Gaozi that is attained by repression and 
his budong xin that is attained by self-cultivation: 
 
                                                
101 Graham, Studies in Chinese Philosophy, 30. 
102 Bloom, “Mencian Arguments”, 25. Also in Norden, Virtue Ethics, 214-215. 
103 Maurizio Scarpari, “The Debate on Human Nature in Early Confucian Literature,” Philosophy East and 
West, Vol. 53, no. 3, (2003): 329. 
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Kao Tzu [Gaozi] had attained to a state of unperturbed mind (pu tung 
shin) [bu dong xin] at an earlier period of life than I did… Kao Tzu says: 
‘What is not attained to in words is not to be sought for in the mind; what 




Xunzi’s thought is also conceptually opposed to Mencius. Xunzi is known for his 
assertion that the “xing of man is bad” while Mencius is known for his view that the 
“xing of man is good.” However, most philosophers (for instance D.C. Lau) are of the 
opinion that such labels are over-simplified – they are certainly insufficient to distinguish 
Xunzi’s view from that of Mencius.105 Xunzi believes that xing is attributed to tian, and is 
the same in all human beings.106 He conceives of the xing of an individual in terms of a 
“basic motivational structure” known as xingqing 性情that is made up of feelings (qing 
情) and desires (yu欲), the latter of which is regarded as responses to qing.107 Unlike 
Mencius, when specifying the content of xing, Xunzi tends to emphasize the negative 
consequences of xing. Hence xing is perceived to be bad. He proclaims that the Way of 
Heaven (tiandao 天道) cannot be attained by developing one’s inborn xing. It is only by 
education, studying the Classics, and learning li that one realizes the Way of the Sages. 
Thus, the central difference between Xunzi and Mencius is such that the former believes 
that our qing and yu are not necessarily structured in a proper manner – they need to be 
reshaped by li (Xunzi has often used the analogy of straightening a crooked piece of 
                                                
104 Fung, A History of Chinese Philosophy, vol.  I, 147. 
105 D.C. Lau, “Theories of Human Nature of Human Nature in Mencius (孟 子) and Shyuntzyy (荀 子),” 
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Vol. 15, no. 3 (1953): 558. 
106 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 222-223. 
107 Antonio S. Cua, Human Nature, Ritual, and History: Studies in Xunzi and Chinese Philosophy, 
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of American Press, 2005) 13-16; Shun, Mencius and Early 
Chinese Thought, 223 -224; and Scarpari, “Debate on Human Nature,” 331-332.  
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wood). In contrast, Mencius believes that our emotional dispositions are already 
structured appropriately. What is needed is just to nurture and develop such 
dispositions.108 
 
Without going into a detailed description of the views of Mencius, Gaozi and 
Xunzi, my intent in this section is to highlight the following. In summary, Mencius, 
Gaozi and Xunzi all accept Yang Zhu’s conception of xing as inborn; it is imparted by 
Heaven, and is constituted by qi. Further, qing is part of xing, similarly rooted in Dao. 
These ideas are accepted without qualification and without question. Their differences lie 
in stressing the different proclivities of xing. For Mencius, it is the positive propensities 
of xing that matter. For Gaozi, xing can incline towards good or bad. Therefore education 
and li are essential in directing xing towards goodness. Xunzi also believes that we need 
education and li to reshape our xing because our xingqing is not structured properly. 
 
Following Mencius, Gaozi and Xunzi, the perspectives of the Han scholars on 
xing and qing incline towards building on what the former three thinkers have already 
established.109 For instance, Fung notes that Dong Zhong-shu’s 董仲舒 179–104 B.C. 
(and the New Text School, Jingwenjia 今文家) theory of xing and qing stems from his 
effort to harmonize the thoughts of Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi.110  
 
                                                
108 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 230-231. 
109 Fung, A History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. II, 33-38 and 161-162. 
110 Ibid., 32-35.  
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Dong’s arguments begin primarily from equating “xing and qing” with “ying and 
yang” respectively: 
 
The human body has within it the nature (hsing) [xing] and the feelings 
(ch’ing) [qing], just as Heaven has the yin and the yang. To speak of 
man’s ‘basic stuff’ and exclude from this his feelings, is like speaking of 
Heaven’s yang while excluding its yin.111 
 
 
In this sense, Fung believes that Dong uses xing both in a broad sense as the 
“basic stuff” that is naturally endowed at birth, and in a narrow sense as the yang part of a 
man’s “basic stuff.” For Dong, the expression of xing is ren 仁 (virtuous love) while the 
expression of qing is tan 贪 (greed or covetousness). As “basic stuff,” xing is good to 
some extent. Nonetheless, since xing includes qing (which is bad), qing has the potential 
of tainting the goodness of xing. Due to this, human effort in the form of education (jiao 
教) is required to restrain qing, and to continue Heaven’s work. In this respect, Dong 
agrees with Mencius that xing contains the incipient beginnings of moral goodness. Yet, 
he also asserts that such beginnings are not enough. Dong likens xing to a “silk cocoon or 
an egg” that needs to be processed or incubated.112 This analogy is extended to the idea 
that xing has to be “permeated with instruction and precept; it is not something that can 
be reached by the ‘basic stuff’ in its raw state.”113 Here, we can see that Dong is 
influenced by Xunzi’s idea of education to fine-tune or reshape our xing. 
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Conclusion 
 
The above snapshot of the early philosophical debate on xing is important because we 
need to understand the intellectual tradition that forms the discursive framework of the 
Wei-Jin discourse on xing and qing. Following the Yang sheng individualists, the 
philosophical treatment of xing has taken on a two-pronged approach considering xing as 
(1) factual, how xing will be without external interference; and (2) normative, the course 
of life that is proper to man.114 This results in the efforts of Mencius, Gaozi and Xunzi to 
specify (1) the content of xing (leading to a discussion on the relation between xing and 
qing); and (2) the place of qing in the ethical life (leading to issues concerning the control 
of qing).  
 
The issues that are raised in this dialogue are critical because they exert an 
immense influence over subsequent xing-qing debates for the next few generations. They 
not only made an important impact on the Han-scholars’ interpretation of Confucianism, 
they also characterized the Wei-Jin approach to xing and qing. Of note is the idea that 
qing as a component of xing, emanates from Dao. From this perspective, the 
philosophical problem confronting the Wei-Jin intellectuals will not be the qing that 
originates from Dao (natural qing is necessarily good because it stems from Dao) but the 
cognitive excesses of xin that veer from, and distort the true nature of things. This crucial 
point will be useful in understanding the philosophical discourse on xing and qing that 
takes place between He Yan and Wang Bi, and subsequently leading into Guo Xiang’s 
thought. Let us now turn to that.  
                                                
114 Graham, Studies in Chinese Philosophy, 14. 
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The Wei-Jin dialogue: Xing 性 , qing 情 , wuqing 无情  and sagehood 
 
Philosophical underpinnings of He Yan, Wang Bi and Guo Xiang 
 
In Wei-Jin China, the question of xing is first raised by the debate between He Yan and 
Wang Bi on the xing of the sage and the role qing plays in sagehood. One generation 
later, Guo Xiang’s view on xing is in turn derived from the philosophical dispute between 
He Yan and Wang Bi. Unfortunately, the breadth and depth of what He Yan, Wang Bi 
and Guo Xiang have covered in their work cannot be sufficiently examined here.115 My 
aim in this section is to sketch an outline of their views, highlighting the salient parts that 
lead us into Guo Xiang’s account of xing.  
 
An analysis of the ideologies of He Yan, Wang Bi and Guo Xiang will not be 
complete without understanding that the three thinkers have all accepted the general 
intellectual understanding with regard to the early discussion on xing – this is namely the 
view that xing is inborn and is constituted by qi that emanates from Dao. From the start of 
their exchanges, they have also viewed qing as a basic category of xing that stems from  
                                                
115 Mather, “Controversy over Conformity and Naturalness,” 163-164. According to Mather, He Yan and 
Wang Bi were never depicted favourably in historical records because the sources that compiled the 
ascendency of He Yan’s faction in the court were his enemies. However, both of them left enough literary 
works for the future generations to grasp the mainstay of their ideas. 
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Dao.116 Therefore, a major part of their doctrines goes to explaining the relation between 
xing and qing and how this will bear on sagehood. To that end, I propose to approach the 
key aspects of their positions on xing from the angles that focus on: 
 
(1) The relation between xing and qing; delving into the concept of wuqing 无情; and 
(2) The implication of xing on sagehood. 
 
 
                                                
116 Chan, “Nature of the Sage,” 200-201. 
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Dao is wu 无 
 
The commentary on History of the Three Kingdoms (Sanguo zhi 三国志) talks about He 
Yan and Wang Bi’s views on the locus of qing in the sage’s nature: 
 
He Yan believed that the sage does not have pleasure and anger, or sorrow 
and joy… Wang Bi offered a contrary view. He believed the sage 
surpasses the common people in his spirit-like perspicacity (shenmin  
神明), but he is the same as everyone in having the five emotions. 
Because of his rich spirit-like perspicacity, he is able to embody harmony 
and thus reach the state of not having anything (wu 无) [such as self-
interest or partiality that would negate harmony]. Because he shares the 
same five emotions, he cannot but have sorrow and joy in response to 
phenomena. However, although the affective capacity of the sage responds 
to things, it is not fettered by them. Now, if in view of the fact that the 
sage is not fettered by things, one concludes that he does not respond to 
them at all, then indeed, one far misses the mark.117 
                                                
117 Sankuo zhi (History of the Three Kingdoms) juan 28, (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1982), 795, n1. This 
translation is taken from Chan, “Nature of the Sage,” 205. Cf. Fung, A History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. 
II, 188-9:  
Ho Yen [He Yan] maintained that the sage lacks either joy or anger, sorrow of pleasure… 
(Wang) Pi, however, differed on this. He maintained that where the sage is vitally 
superior to other men is in his spirit-like intelligence, but where he is like other men is in 
having the five emotions. Being superior in his spirit-like intelligence, he is able to 
identify himself with the harmonious whole, so that he is imbued with non-being (wu 无); 
but being like others in his five emotions, he cannot but react to things, he is not ensnared 
by them. It is a great error, consequently, to say that because he is not ensnared by things, 
he therefore has no (emotional) reactions to them. 
According to Fung, Wang Bi has initially agreed with He Yan’s argument that Zhuangzi teaches us to 
transform our emotions through reason. Using the example of Confucius’ reaction when his favourite 
disciple Yen Hui died, “Alas! Heaven has bereft me. Heaven has bereft me.” (Analects, XI, 8), Confucius is 
criticized for his inability to use reason to transform his emotions to come to the realization that death is a 
natural course of life, and therefore there is no reason for experiencing grief. This is how He Yan concludes 
that “the sage lacks either joy or anger, sorrow or pleasure.” Wang Bi changes his stance later when he 
argues that “human emotion is natural to one’s nature.” Therefore it is natural that Confucius should mourn 
over the death of Yen Hui. Therefore a sage may react to things emotionally but he is not “ensnared” by 
them. 
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It has been generally assumed that while He Yan views the sage as wuqing 无情 
(that is, the sage does not experience emotions such as joy, anger, sadness, etc.), Wang Bi 
considers qing as part of the sage’s nature just like any other ordinary person. Therefore 
for Wang Bi, a sage may react to things emotionally as long as he is not “fettered” by 
them.118 In “The Nature of the Sage and the Emotions: A Debate in Wei-Jin Philosophy 
Revisited,” Chan argues otherwise. He maintains that He Yan’s assertion that “the sage 
lacks either joy or anger, sorrow or pleasure” does not mean that the sage lacks the 
affective functions of qing. Instead, it “reflects a conception of sage nature that mirrors 
the Dao in being undifferentiated and complete [quan 全].”119 Chan’s claim is that He 
Yan believes the inborn xing of the sage cannot be anathema to qing. If Dao is seen to be 
complete (quan), and qing arises from qi that emanates from Dao, the xing of a sage 
cannot be lacking in any way, including in qing. Consequently, wuqing is not so much the 
absence of qing or emotions than the suggestion that the “extraordinary nature of sage 
does not harbor partiality and thus, logically, precludes specific emotions such as 
pleasure and anger.”120 In other words, the sage who is wuqing is one who is not affected 
or enslaved by emotions because he is impartial; his actions do not arise from self-
interest.  
 
                                                
118 Fung, History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. II, 188-189. 
119 Chan, “Nature of the Sage,” 204. 
120 Ibid., 203-4. 
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What is the significance of He Yan’s view on xing and sagehood? Using Chan’s 
analysis, let us trace the steps of He Yan’s arguments. First, He Yan delineates Dao as wu 
无: “The Dao, in fact, is that which has nothing that it has” 夫道者惟无所有者也.121 
According to Rudolf Wagner, this means Dao is nameless and unspecific 无所有, that is, 
undifferentiated or lacking in distinctions. Dao is also conceived as complete, quan; it 
will bring forth “sounds and echoes, generate qi and things, establish form and spirit, and 
illuminate light and shadows.”122 Second, sage-xing exemplifies the wu-properties of Dao 
because it is rooted in Dao. Therefore, sage-xing is special in that it is nameless, 
undifferentiated and quan.123 Third, He Yan believes that Dao endows the sage with 
superior qi that is the basis of his special xing. This special xing is deemed to be 
nameless, undifferentiated and quan. Fourth, the special xing of the sage implies that he 
is born an exceptional being that sets him apart from the common folk. That being the 
case, it follows that sage-xing must be strictly inborn and beyond the reach of the 
ordinary person. From this, we can see that He Yan’s view is limiting and exclusive 
because one does not “become” a sage but is “born” a sage – hence, one’s xing is 
necessary and sufficient in attaining sagehood.124  
 
                                                
121 Rudolf G. Wagner, Language, Ontology and Political Philosophy in China: Wang Bi’s Scholarly 
Exploration of the Dark (Xuanxue) (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2003), 53. 
122 He Yan, Daolun 道论 in Yang Bojun Liezi jishi, (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1985). This is translated by Chan, 
“Nature of the Sage,” 202. 
123 Wagner, Language, Ontology, and Political Philosophy, 53-55. Here, Wagner quotes the Liezi/Lunyu to 
establish that for He Yan, the sage cannot be defined by a name, and is thus unspecific and unnameable. 
124 Chan, “Nature of the Sage,” 222. 
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Given this new understanding of He Yan, Chan contends that Wang Bi’s 
departure from the former must be re-evaluated from the perspective that Wang Bi 
believes sagehood is attainable by all if one sets one’s mind to it. Wang Bi claims that 
sagehood is a state whereby qing does not deviate from the xing that is constituted in 
Dao. Under the purest conditions whereby qing embraces xing completely, qing will give 
rise to the proper cognitive and affective responses; in that sense, expressions of joy and 
anger are purely legitimate.125  
 
Ultimately, Wang Bi thinks that a sage is superior to the common folk because of 
his shenming神明 (clarity of xin), and what makes him the same as the common people is 
his possession of the “five emotions” of happiness, anger, sadness, pleasure and desire.126 
This translates into a depiction of sage as one who (1) possesses strong and pure qi [ this 
is nong 浓 qi as opposed to weak (bo 薄) qi]; and (2) displays wuqing in that he possesses 
shenming that ensures qing abides by the “naturalness,” “stillness” and “simplicity” of 
xing.127 The source of Wang Bi’s method of dealing with qing can be traced to Chapter 
Seven of the Zhuangzi:  
 
至人之用心若镜，不将不迎，应而不藏，故能胜物而不伤。  
The Perfect Man uses his mind like a mirror – going after nothing, 
welcoming nothing, responding but not storing. Therefore he can win over 
things and not hurt himself.128 
 
                                                
125 Chan, “Nature of the Sage,” 209-10 
126 Richard John Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue: A New Translation of the Tao-te ching of Laozi 
as Interpreted by Wang Bi (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 13. 
127 Chan, “Nature of the Sage,” 206-213. 
128 Burton Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 97 
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This aspect of shenming is akin to the Perfect Man who uses his mind like a 
mirror 至人之用心若镜 – he reflects the true nature of things without responding to it  
不将不迎, 应而不藏. Such naturalness that results from the stillness of xin means that 
the Perfect Man is one who remains unburdened by qing. 
 
To figure out both He Yan and Wang Bi’s positions on xing, we need to lay bare 
the source of the disagreement between them. Like He Yan, Wang Bi recognizes that 
different people have different levels of qi. Nevertheless, Wang Bi reaches a very 
different conclusion from He Yan – this fact of different qi-constitution does not prevent 
one (who is not endowed with superior qi) from achieving sagehood. In other words, 
Wang Bi objects to He Yan’s thesis that sagehood is solely inborn. Viewed in this light, 
Wang Bi’s gripe must be with the content of xing, and his disagreement would stem from 
a different understanding of Dao as wu. Here I quote Chan’s comments on Wang Bi’s 
understanding of wu: 
 
The concept of wu, as Wang Bi understands it, does not refer to any 
primordial substance of the source of qi; it signals ontological priority in a 
logical sense that the origin of beings cannot be itself a being. In other 
words, the logic of creation requires an absolute “other,” a “nonbeing,” but 
“nonbeing” is entirely conceptual and has no external referent.129 
 
 
Given that Dao as wu is conceptual and non-referential for Wang Bi, the 
definition of xing (that emanates from Dao) becomes stymied. Taking into account his 
endeavor to demonstrate the inability of language to define Dao, he cannot be caught in a 
                                                
129 Chan, “Nature of the Sage,” 208. 
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semantic contradiction by delineating Dao and by the same token xing, in terms of 
qualities such as namelessness and completeness for instance. Consequently, Wang Bi 
can only use non-referential concepts like ziran 自然 (naturalness) and zhen 真 
(authenticity) to describe the functions (yong 用) of Dao and xing.130 That means that 
Dao and xing are defined not in relation to themselves, but in relation to their relationship 
with things in the universe.  
 
Essentially, Wang Bi believes that the basis of order in the universe is ziran, and 
the xing of the myriad things is ziran – wan wu yi ziran wei xing 万物以自然为性.131 If 
the xing of the entities that make up the universe is not “interfered with” wu wei yu wan 
wu 无为于万物, each will “fit its own use” wan wu ge shi qi suo yong 万物各适其所用, 
and all will be provided for.132 According to Richard Lynn, this is close to ideas of “there 
is no making it so” wu shi zi ran 无使自然 or “no causing things to be as they are” wu shi 
wu ran 无使物然.133 Here, Wagner’s insight on Wang Bi’s notion of ziran is also useful: 
 
Wang Bi thus claims an intrinsic non-randomness for the interaction 
among the entities, a kind of prestabilized harmony described in Leibniz’ 
monadology. It does not come about through struggle or compromise, 
                                                
130 Rudolf G. Wagner, The Craft of a Chinese Commentator: Wang Bi on the Laozi, (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2000), 282-283 and 293, According to Wagner, Wang Bi uses zhen to 
define the “Uncarved” simplicity (pu 朴). Also in Wagner, Language, Ontology, and Political Philosophy, 
109-110. Also in Lynn, The Classic Way, 17-18. Also in Chan, “Nature of the Sage”, 209.  
131 Wagner, Language, Ontology, and Political Philosophy, 110, WB on LZ 29.3. 
132 Ibid., 109-110, WB on LZ 5.1. 
133 Richard John Lynn, “The Influence of Guo Xiang’s Commentary to the Zhuangzi on Chinese Literary 
Thought of the Six Dynasties Era,” A Paper Prepared for the International Conference on Literature from 
High Antiquity, the Three Dynasties, Qin, Han, Three Kingdoms, and the Six Dynasties and Civilization of 
China, 11-12 Oct, 2001, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 2. 
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order or planning, but it is encoded in the form of a functional relationship 
into the very “nature” of the entities…134 
 
 
This means that for Wang Bi, xing consists of the intrinsic harmony of ziran that 
is characterized by simplicity (pu 朴) and stillness – as long as xing is not disturbed or 
interfered with, one can attain shenming. Therefore, he declares that if one’s qing abides 
in the “stillness of xin,” which is essentially defined as “xing under the purest 
conditions,” one embodies wu, achieves shenming and realizes the Way of Dao.135  
 
 
Dao is ziran 
 
Guo Xiang shares He Yan’s view that there are different degrees to xing and that the 
“limits of one’s nature and capacity are set by qi.”136 Therefore, both philosophers 
believe that there are those who are born with the purest qi that destine them for 
sagehood. Nevertheless, Guo Xiang’s approach towards sagehood differs from that of He 
Yan. Guo Xiang believes that even if everyone is endowed with different qi-capacities, 
an individual can still attain sagehood because his xing is ziran (self-sufficient and self-
forgetting), complete in its own right.137 Buoyed by Wang Bi’s vision that sagehood is 
attainable by all, Guo Xiang proclaims that despite the fact that all individuals differ in 
                                                
134 Wagner, Language, Ontology and Political Philosophy, 110. Wang Bi introduces the concept of li 理 to 
specify aspects of an entity’s functional interaction with the others in their “non-randomness.” 
135 Chan, “Nature of the Sage,” 210-213. 
136 Ibid., 215. 
137 More will be said about Guo Xiang’s concept of ziran as self-sufficient and self-forgetting in the next 
part of the thesis. 
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their qi-constitution, there is equal opportunity for all to achieve sagehood because Dao is 
ziran. Since xing is imparted from Dao, xing is also ziran. This is in line with his remarks 
in Chapter One of the Zhuangzi which states that self-fulfillment is achieved despite 




Although the small and the great differ, as long as they let themselves go 
in the realm of self-fulfilment [zide 自得], creatures shall abide by their 
natures [xing 性], their behavior shall correspond to their abilities [neng  
能], and each shall fulfil its capacity [fen 分], for spontaneous free play 
[xiaoyao 逍遥] is the same for all; how could success or failure have any 
place here?138  
 
 
Nonetheless, even if Guo Xiang is on the same page as Wang Bi in terms of the 
attainability of sagehood despite the different qi-levels, his thinking would differ from the 
latter in that Guo Xiang does not construe Dao as wu. For him, Dao is ziran. Rather than 
subsuming mankind under the abstract principle of wu, Guo Xiang’s approach is to use 
the concept of ziran to establish the ontological independence of human beings. (I will 
return to this point in the next chapter when I detail the reasons why Guo Xiang rejects 
Dao as wu.) 
 
                                                
138 Lynn, Zhuangzi, 12. 
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Such an idea of ontological independence leads to an unusual understanding of 
xing vis-à-vis sagehood whereby self-realization is achieved, despite having different 
degrees of fixed allotment from Dao. Chan writes, 
 
 
The logic of qi dictates that there must be sages who are born with a 
special sage nature, but it does not follow that those who are differently 
endowed cannot become sages. It reflects but one’s misguided judgement 
if the latter were seen as being “inferior” and thus incapable of attaining 
complete self-realization. From this perspective, the immutability of xing 
and the attainability of sagehood are not mutually exclusive.139  
 
 
In relation to Guo Xiang’s conception of sagehood, how does he construe the 
statement “perfect person does not have emotions” zhiren wuqing 至人无情? Building on 
He Yan and Wang Bi’s discussions on sage-xing and qing, Guo Xiang claims that 
although the sage experiences the affective dimension of qing, he does not engage in 
cognitive excesses that cause the expression of qing to be extreme and unleveled. The 
sage reaches a state of authentic being by harmonizing his qing with Dao to keep his xing 
intact. This is made clear by Guo Xiang’s remarks on Zhuangzi’s statement (found in 
Chapter Ten of the Zhuangzi) that the sage alone keeps his wholeness intact (quan 全) by 
yielding (qu 屈): “By yielding to perfect truth, he always keeps his wholeness intact. 
Thus he has no good fortune to seek, as he already has all the good fortune he 
needs…”140 Therefore, regardless of the difference in qi-endowments in various persons, 
as long as qing is rid of its cognitive excesses, qing is harmonized with Dao. In so doing, 
                                                
139 Chan, “Nature of the Sage,” 216. 
140 Lynn, The Classic Way, 89-90, n1. 
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the sage “yields to perfect truth,” and self-realization and sagehood are thus achievable. 
This in turn leads to the idea of wuqing as an inner state of mind, unperturbed by 
cognitive distinctions and judgments.141  
 
To dig deeper into Guo Xiang’s idea of wuqing, let us consider his comments 
regarding the conversation between Huizi and Confucius on whether humans can be 





Master Zhuang replied, “The tendency to approve [shi 是] and disapprove 
[fei 非] is what I mean by predilection [qing 情]. When I say that one 
should be without predilections [wuqing 无情], I mean that one should not 
allow likes and dislikes to harm his person within but that instead he 





Guo Xiang: Since it is the propensity to approve or disapprove that 
constitutes predilection, one who stays free of approval and disapproval, 
like and dislike, though he has a physical appearance, he is nothing other 
than what he himself is, so what room could predilection find in him? To 
trust to [ren 任] thusness [dang 当] and just keep moving forward has 




                                                
141 Chan, “Two Ethical Perspectives,” 11-12. 
142 Lynn, Zhuangzi, 134-135. 
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When Zhuangzi advises Huizi not to let likes and dislikes harm his person 
言人之不以好恶内伤其身, he means that one should follow one’s true nature that is 
endowed by Dao without falling into the pitfalls of shi and fei. This explains Guo Xiang’s 
comment that such a person stays within his “thusness” 止于当也. In order to follow 
one’s nature, one must not let the cognitive excesses of xin take over (thereby producing 
shifei) and distort one’s xing; one should harmonize one’s qing with Dao. According to 
Chan, such an ideal ethical state would then speak of “true” emotions that reflect the 
authenticity of being.143 
 
For Guo Xiang, qing encompasses affective and cognitive functions. The affective 
function of qing is not necessarily frowned upon because like He Yan, Guo Xiang 
associates affective qing with a “deeper, inner equanimity.”144 Yet at the same time, qing 
has its basis in shi and fei 是非为情. Therefore to be wuqing, it is crucial that xin does 
not cause qing to tend towards cognitive extremes. (Recall our earlier discussion on the 
relation between xing and qing in the early Chinese context.) This means that even as the 
sage displays pleasure or sadness, wuqing simply denotes a state of non-judgment 
whereby he does not make value distinctions of shi and fei. In this way, the sage “stays 
free of approval and disapproval, like and dislike” 无是无非无好无恶. In sagely 
transcendence, the “perfect person does not have emotions” zhiren wuqing 至人无情 – 
he is impartial (“shi and fei have no effect on him”), and is therefore “withered as are the 
branches of a dead tree.”145  
                                                
143 Chan, “Two Ethical Perspectives,” 16. 
144 Chan, “Nature of the Sage,” 218. 
145 Ibid.; and Lynn, Zhuangzi, 133. 
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Following this argument, it appears that for Guo Xiang, wuqing is the key to self-
development. By being wuqing, one recognizes the futility of shi and fei, thereby 
transcending one’s self-interests (of right and wrong, likes and dislikes, and other value 
variants of shi and fei).146 In Chan’s view, wuqing also suggests an ideal mode whereby 
“one lives to the full in the natural order of qing without incurring any emotive 
disturbance in the heart. This can accommodate a range of ethical behavior, from 
apparent indifference to displays of strong emotions.”147 In this respect, wuqing can 
signify the entire spectrum of affective responses so long as the response is natural, and 





The above discussion forms a brief background to the intellectual milieu of the Wei-Jin 
period, highlighting the main concerns and issues that surround the nature of Guo 
Xiang’s work on xing. However, it does not serve our purpose to evaluate in detail the 
differences and merits of these Wei-Jin thinkers’ approaches to xing. Our focus here is on 
Guo Xiang’s view, in particular what leads him to have such an account of xing.  
 
Earlier on, I have mentioned that the review of the Wei-Jin dialogue on xing will 
be done based on (1) the relation between xing and qing; and (2) the implication of xing 
                                                
146 Chan, “Nature of the Sage,” 220. 
147 Chan, “Two Ethical Perspectives,” 17. 
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on sagehood. In view of (1), we have managed to establish the following on Guo Xiang’s 
view of xing pertaining to qing and wuqing vis-à-vis the thought of He Yan and Wang 
Bi:148 
 
He Yan Wang Bi  Guo Xiang 
The sage is not enslaved by 
the affective function of 
qing. 
 
The sage is not burdened by 
the cognitive and affective 
functions of qing. 
 
If qing abides by xing, xing 
will give rise to proper 
cognitive and affective 
responses. 
 
The sage is not disturbed by 
the affective function of 
qing. 
 
The sage understands the 
working of qing as a sense 
of “inner equanimity.”  
 
 
Wuqing means sage-xing is 
complete (quan 全) and 
undifferentiated, i.e., the 
sage is impartial and acts 
without self-interest. 
 
Wuqing means the sage 
possesses clear 
understanding or shenming, 
and he abides in quietude 
and non-action.  
Wuqing means the sage 
does not make cognitive 
judgments of shi and fei; he 
is impartial and acts without 
self-interest. 
                                                
148 This table is derived from a summary of Chan’s work, “Nature of the Sage.” 
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In view of (2), the next table illustrates Guo Xiang’s take on sagehood relating to 




Wang Bi Guo Xiang 
Qi constitutes xing. 
 
Qi constitutes xing. Qi constitutes xing. 
Xing is inborn, rooted in 
Dao. 
 
Xing is inborn, rooted in 
Dao. 
 
Xing is ziran: It is natural 
and tends towards 
“stillness” (proper cognitive 
acts of qing). 
 
Xing is inborn, rooted in 
Dao. 
 
Xing is ziran: It is self-
sufficient and self-
forgetting. 
Dao is wu: It is complete 
(quan 全 ), undifferentiated 
and nameless (no 
distinctions). 
 
Dao is wu: It is conceptual 
and non-referential. It 
signals ontological priority. 
Dao is ziran. 
There are different qi-levels 
and xing in different 
individuals. 
 
There are different qi-levels 
in different individuals, but 
xing as “stillness” is the 
same for all. 
 
There are different qi-levels 
and xing in different 
individuals. 
 
The sage embodies wu and 
possesses sage-xing that 
consists of special qi-
constitution. 
 
Sagehood is restricted to 
those born with special 
xing. 
 
The sage embodies wu and 
attains authentic nature; he 
possesses shenming 
whereby one’s qing abides 
by “stillness” of xing. 
 
Sagehood is attainable by 
anyone who realizes his 
authentic nature. 
 
The sage attains self-
forgetting where there is no 
distinction between “shi 
是and fei 非,” “shi 是 and 
bi 彼.” 
 
Sagehood is attainable by 
anyone who self-forgets. 
 
 
                                                
149 This table is derived from a summary of Chan’s work, “Nature of the Sage.” 
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Next, we want to investigate the implications of Guo Xiang’s ideas for the 
concept of selfhood. For this, we need to turn to his concepts of ziran and duhua 独化 
that will be elaborated in the next chapter of this thesis. 




A Wei-Jin notion of self in Guo Xiang’s thought 
 
 
Ziran 自然  and the existence of all things  
 
Xing as self-sufficient and self-forgetting 
 
To recap, the Yang sheng individualists’ ideas on self-preservation popularize the 
understanding that one’s xing emanates from Dao and is constituted by qi. Therefore, 
when Guo Xiang says that sagehood is possible even though everyone’s qi-capacity is 
different, he is subscribing to the proposition that the xing of an individual is innate, 
unchangeable, complete and sufficient in its own right. Seen in this light, the most natural 
conclusion of Guo Xiang’s view locates selfhood in the xing-core of an individual – this 
establishes the concept of xing as embodied in human existence. In other words, I am 
what I am because of my inborn xing. Such innate qualities of mine is a given, something 
I am born with, something I cannot change. Further, Guo Xiang’s view would imply that 
my own xing is complete in itself – even if I am not born with a sage-xing, and I do not 
have an exceptional qi-constitution, it is still possible for me to achieve sagehood through 
self-realization. As Chan observes in “The Nature of the Sage and the Emotions,” for 
Guo Xiang, sage-xing may be a sufficient condition, but it is not a necessary condition for 
attaining sagehood.150  
                                                
150 Chan, “Nature of the Sage,” 222. 
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Such an essentialist outlook on xing does not sum up Guo Xiang’s view of 
selfhood in its entirety. It must be said that for him, self-realization is attained without 
relinquishing the idea of the interrelatedness of human experience. This is because he 
believes in a cosmological system whereby the myriad things in the universe are 
continually interacting with and reinforcing each other. In such an environment, the 
human experience is one of dynamism and symbiosis whereby individuals exist in a 
space of constant flux and mutual reinforcement. Notably for Guo Xiang, this does not 
mean that one’s selfhood is therefore derived from one’s interactions with the others in 
one’s environment. As far as he is concerned, one’s xing remains inviolable, immutable 
and intact, even as one accepts and transforms with the myriad things in the cosmos.  
 
Guo Xiang is able to articulate this unique view through a creative appropriation 
of Zhuangzi’s thought based on the concept of spontaneity (ziran 自然).151 To him, ziran 
is the principle that governs the existence of all things. Ziran would lead to his attempt to 
define selfhood as a process of cosmic transformation. This invariably leads to a view of 
the self that is constituted by a xing-core, understood to be interacting with, but not 
defined by its relationship with the myriad things in the cosmos.  
 
In order to understand how Guo Xiang arrives at such a conception of xing, I will 
attempt to show that ziran has double implications for xing:  
 
                                                
151 Lynn, “The Influence of Guo Xiang’s Commentary,” 2. Richard Lynn notes that out of the few concepts 
found in Guo Xiang’s thought, ziran is by far the most central concept that appears significantly in his 
work. The term ziran is translated as Nature by Fung and Chan Wing-tsit. Brook Ziporyn translates ziran as 
self-so. In this thesis, I am using Richard Lynn’s translation of ziran as spontaneity. 
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(1) Self-sufficiency in the systematic rejection of metaphysical absoluteness; and  
(2) Self-forgetting (or self-transcendence) in the rejection of cognitive absoluteness.152  
 
This will bring us neatly to a unique blend of xing-core and interrelatedness in Guo 
Xiang’s view of the self as self-sufficient and self-forgetting in unity and oneness with 
the universe (xuantong 玄同).  
 
 
Ziran and self-sufficiency  
 
The concept of self and the process of self-discovery during the Wei-Jin period can be 
linked to the establishment of the Pure Conversation (Qingtan 清谈). As a movement, 
Qingtan is culturally-oriented. It delves into music, poetry, philosophy, etc. while 
ignoring the politics of the day. One of the main forays of Qingtan is cosmological 
discourse directed at the meaning of Dao. Spearheaded by Wang Bi and He Yan, the 
members of Qingtan created Xuanxue that is based on the rejection of a teleological 
cosmos which imposes a hierarchical structure of social norms and rituals on man.153 This 
leads to the view that human liberation and development is premised upon the 
                                                
152 A similar classification of ziran is found in Ziporyn’s work Penumbra Unbound. 
153 Ziporyn, Penumbra Unbound, 18; and Yü, “Individualism and the Neo-Taoist Movement,” 134-5. We 
would want to exercise some caution here. Although Yü claims that all the Wei-Jin Daoists such as He Yan 
and Wang Bi reacted against the teleological and hierarchical orientation of cosmology, according to Brook 
Ziporyn and Chan Wing-tsit, there is a difference between Wang Bi and Guo Xiang. Unlike Wang Bi, Guo 
Xiang does not need an over-arching reality to govern things. Brook Ziporyn writes: 
While Wang Pi [Wang Bi] emphasizes the one, Kuo [Guo Xiang] emphasizes the many. 
To Wang Pi, principle transcends things, but to Kuo, it is immanent in them… This 
means Kuo does not recognise a “substance” apart from “function,” nor any overriding 
single essence or principle that is expressed through unessential manifestations or 
phenomena.  
It is not the objective of this thesis to dwell on the differences in thought between Wang Bi and Guo Xiang.  
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recognition that there is no God, Heaven or any metaphysical entity that orders reality. 
Henceforth, the relationship of the self with respect to the universe is to be defined in a 
very different way whereby the notion of self is informed by ideas of self-sufficiency and 
ontological independence. 
 
Philosophers like Chan Wing-tsit (henceforth Chan W.T.) regard Guo Xiang as 
one of the thinkers who are influenced by Xuanxue because he is known for his emphatic 
denial of any transcendental essence or metaphysical absolute.154 It is generally agreed 
that Guo Xiang holds that all phenomena cannot be issued from the transcendental 
totality of Dao because all things are ziran, spontaneously self-generated and self-
sufficient. The notion of ziran plays such a central role in Guo Xiang’s work that scholars 
like Brook Ziporyn would agree with Chan W.T.’s observation that the key concept in his 
rendition of the Zhuangzi is “no longer Tao [Dao]… but Nature [ziran]. Things exist and 
transform themselves spontaneously and there is no other reality or agent to cause 
them… Everything is therefore self-sufficient and there is no need of an overall original 
reality to combine or govern them.”155  
 
A note of caution needs to be exercised here: It is not that Guo Xiang has 
eliminated the concept of Dao completely. Rather, it a matter of him conceptualizing Dao 
quite differently from his predecessors like He Yan and Wang Bi. For a more cogent 
explanation, we must turn to Guo Xiang’s comments on the heavenly pipes of Nanguo 
Ziqi in Chapter Two of the Zhuangzi. Ziqi asks Zhuangzi why the Heavenly pipes blow 
                                                
154 Chan Wing-tsit, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1973), 317.  
155 Ziporyn, Penumbra Unbound, 18.  
  72 
through the different myriad things and yet allow these things to thrive on their own. Guo 
Xiang’s remarks on Zhuangzi’s response are cited: 
 
无既无矣, 则不能生有; 有之未生, 又不能为生。然则生生者谁哉? 
块然而自生耳。自生耳，非我生也。我既不能生物，物亦不能生我，
则我自然矣。自己而然, 则谓之天然。…… 故天者, 万物之总名 
也，莫适为天，谁主役物乎？故物各自生而无所出焉，此天道也。物
皆自得之耳，谁主怒之使然哉! 此重明天籁也。 
Nothingness [wu 无] is just that—nothingness—so it cannot generate 
phenomenal reality [somethingness] [you 有].  As phenomenal reality has 
not yet been generated, it cannot cause generation either.  Since this is so, 
what is it then that does all this generation?  Actually, clod-like [kuairan 
块 然] [intrinsically] things generate themselves.  Since they generate 
themselves, it is not I who generate them.  As I cannot generate something 
else, something else cannot generate me either—thus I am spontaneously 
what I am [ziran 自然].  When something is so by itself [ziji er 
ran自己而然], we call it “natural” [tianran 天然]. …… Therefore, 
“Heaven” is the general term for the myriad things, and, since not any one 
thing corresponds to “Heaven,” what master is there to control things?  
Thus it is that everything generates itself—there is no other source from 
which things come—such is the Dao of Heaven.156 
 
 
If we consider Guo Xiang’s remarks on wu, we can infer that his unhappiness 
with wu as “nothingness” is a matter of conceptual disagreement over what constitutes 
Dao. The main objective of his comments in the story of Nanguo Ziqi is to criticize Wang 
Bi’s view of Dao as wu. For Guo Xiang, wu is abstract – as “nothingness,” it cannot 
generate phenomena 无既无矣, 则不能生有.  Having rejected Wang Bi’s Dao as wu, 
Guo Xiang puts forward the proposition that the principle of ziran or self-generation is 
the “Dao of Heaven” 故物各自生而无所出焉, 此天道也. As the principle that governs 
the existence of all things, ziran refers to the spontaneous self-generation that is not made 
                                                
156 Lynn, Zhuangzi, 31. 
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or caused by a metaphysical entity (such as Heaven) 莫适为天，谁主役物乎, or reality 
(such as wu). This makes up Guo Xiang’s attempt to guard against metaphysical 
absoluteness in terms of an external “master controller” or an “overall guiding principle.” 
Wagner observes rather accurately that Guo Xiang’s challenge to Wang Bi actually helps 
to define the latter’s position better – namely, Wang Bi believes that the order of the 
myriad things ultimately depends on the relationship with a controlling/dominating 
principle conceived as Dao.157 Given Guo Xiang’s resistance to such a controlling 
principle, he simply cannot agree with Wang Bi’s idea of Dao as wu. 
 
Guo Xiang’s conception of ziran has three implications for the idea of self. First, 
it is important to reiterate here that Guo Xiang comes from a school of thought that holds 
that our xing is endowed by Dao and is constituted by qi.158 Given that Dao is ziran, ziran 
forms the natural limits to one’s xing. Different people receive different levels of qi from 
Dao. Therefore, my xing can be vastly different from another person’s xing. Second, 
because of the self-sufficient nature of ziran, xing is complete – what Dao endows me 
with is adequate in itself. Third, due to such self-sufficiency, ziran denotes that one’s 
xing-core is subject to no other external influence, control or interference. As such, the 
circumstances I am in, and the interactions that I have with other people do not add on to 
or subtract from my xing. These three characteristics would summarily establish the 
nature of uniqueness, self-sufficiency and inviolability of my xing-core.  
 
                                                
157 Wagner, Language, Ontology and Political Philosophy, 115. Also in Rudolf G. Wagner, A Chinese 
Reading of the Daodejing: Wang Bi’s Commentary on the Laozi with Critical Text and Translation, 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2003), 406 n23. Also in Ziporyn, Penumbra Unbound, 
43. 
158 Chan, “Nature of the Sage,” 215. 
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So far, we have seen how Guo Xiang delineates a conception of self that is 
constituted by a xing-core that is unique in different individuals, and self-sufficient and 
inviolable in nature. Through the principle of ziran, Guo Xiang shifts the focus to a 
person’s xing-core instead of Dao as a transcendental being/principle that controls a 
person’s xing. This contributes to the idea that selfhood is embodied in human existence. 
However, this is not the complete story. Ziran also operates in the world of human 
experiences. Here is another dimension of ziran that stems from an understanding of the 
concept as self-forgetting. The significance of ziran as self-forgetting will bear on Guo 
Xiang’s eventual theory of self-realization and transformation that is essential to the 
attainment of sagehood (especially for those who are not gifted with a sage-xing). To 
examine Guo Xiang’s argument, we first need to explore (1) what he means by ziran as 




Shifei 是非: Cognitive excesses, differentiated emotions and self-interests 
 
As Chan points out, Guo Xiang (like He Yan) believes that our xing is limited by the 
different qi-endowments that we are born with. This is due to his belief that “each thing 
has its own nature, and each by nature has its own limits” 物各有性，性各有极.159 
Hence only those who are born with qi of first-rate quality are born sages.160 This means 
                                                
159 Lynn, Zhuangzi, 14. 
160 Chan, “Nature of the Sage,” 215. 
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that for the ordinary folks, there is really no point in coveting or trying to emulate those 
who are thus gifted in nature. In the peng story found in Chapter One of the Zhuangzi, 
Guo Xiang remarks that the peng does not have to feel proud, neither does the little bird 




If one is sufficient unto one’s own nature, then the great peng will have no 
reason to think itself more noble than the little bird, and the little bird will 
not covet the Pool of Heaven, for each will have more than enough to 
fulfil its desires. Thus it is that although the small and great differ, 
spontaneous freedom is the same for all.161 
 
 
Because all things abide by ziran in their existence, and by that implication, all 
things are self-sufficient, there is really no cause for concern over the greatness or 
smallness of anything because xiaoyao 逍遙 is the same for all. Everyone is born with a 
specific level of qi that makes up his xing – since one’s xing is a matter of fixed 
allotment, xing varies from individual to individual. It does not matter if I am endowed 
with a “great” qi or a “small” qi. Either way, it is still possible for me to achieve self-
realization and eventually, sagehood. In that sense, there is no need to differentiate 
between “great and small” (daxiao 大小) or “success and failure” (shengfu 胜负). Such 




                                                
161 Lynn, Zhuangzi, 14. 
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Although the small and the great differ, as long as they let themselves go 
in the realm of self-fulfilment [zide 自得], creatures shall abide by their 
natures [xing 性], their behavior shall correspond to their abilities [neng 
能], and each shall fulfil its capacity [fen 分], for spontaneous free play 




Since there is no value judgement of “right and wrong,” “great and small,” or 
“success and failure” in the state of ziran, one is immune to such value distinctions when 
one abides by ziran. One becomes entirely comfortable with one’s own xing. In other 
words, for Guo Xiang, the idea of ziran implies that the inviolability or irreducibility of 
one’s xing-core is not influenced by the conscious valuation of preferring one thing to 
another.163 From this, it is clear that Guo Xiang’s main concern is to eradicate cognitive 
absoluteness that arises from the deliberate thought on the part of man. He is opposed to 
cognitive absoluteness because it prevents us from experiencing the world as it is, in a 
state of Dao and undifferentiation. Rather, cognitive absoluteness leads us to interpreting 
the world through our own preferences, values, and belief-systems. Such resistance 
towards the ills of cognitive absoluteness is close in spirit to what Hamlet, the prince of 
Denmark expresses about “thinking” in Shakespeare’s Hamlet. In the earlier part of the 
play, Hamlet greets his guests Rosencrantz and Guildenstern by surprising them with his 
comment that Denmark is a prison. When Rosencrantz says that he does not think that 
Denmark is a prison, Hamlet’s reply reflects Guo Xiang’s concern about cognitive 
                                                
162 Lynn, Zhuangzi, 12. 
163 Ziporyn, Penumbra Unbound, 33-37. 
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absoluteness: “’Tis none to you for thee is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes 
it so: to me it is a prison.”164 
 
Ziporyn cautions us that Guo Xiang’s objection to cognitive absoluteness is not 
directed at the divisions of all things for he believes that such divisions are in themselves 
ziran: “Heaven’s allotment [tianni 天倪] is the natural allotment [ziran zhi fen 自然之分] 
of things 天倪者，自然之分也.”165 Rather, he is opposed to the cognitive excesses of 
man that tend to differentiate things in terms of “it is this” (shi 是) and “it is not” (fei 非). 
In other words, Guo Xiang believes that cognitive absoluteness arises from the cognitive 
excesses of shifei. Therefore to grasp the mainstay of Guo Xiang’s objection to cognitive 
absoluteness, we must examine what shifei means to him. Chan observes that Guo Xiang 
seems to go beyond the understanding of shifei as moral judgments of right and wrong. 
Here, it is useful to cite his remarks: 
 
What Guo Xiang seems to have in mind is that shi and fei, “right” and 
“wrong,” are fundamentally expressions of self-interest; shi is ultimately 
what is right for oneself and fei, what is against one’s interests. Shifei are 
operations of the heart-mind; they explain how we form our likes and 
dislikes, which in turn give rise to pleasure, anger, and other emotions.166 
 
 
                                                
164 William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act II, Scene II. I owe this example to Ken Robinson who writes about 
the connection between thinking and creativity in The Element: How Finding Your Passion Changes 
Everything, (London: Allen Lane, 2009), 80-82. 
165 Lynn, Zhuangzi, 59. 
166 Chan, “Nature of the Sage,” 220. 
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This means that shifei is the result of making value distinctions between things – 
as soon as a person starts to distinguish between things, he will develop his own 
preferences of what he likes and what he dislikes.167 
 
The key thing to understanding Guo Xiang’s idea of shifei is to know what it is 
fuelled by. Essentially, shifei is produced when the xing of a person comes into contact 
with the phenomenal world. The following diagram illustrates the process of xing’s 
interaction with phenomena: 
 
Cognitive excesses                     Cognitive absoluteness                       Self-interest ensues 
 
 
Xin engages in shifei               Qing forms pian 偏 and ai 爱         Si 私 ensues 
 
 
Primarily, the dominant view is that shifei is a result of the cognitive activities of 
xin, the heart-mind. When my xing comes into contact with things, my cognitive actions 
and thoughts (arising from xin) will result in shifei, thereby causing the affective capacity 
of my xing to be activated.168 For example, if my xin engages in shifei in my interaction 
with things, my affective qing-capacity will trigger differentiated emotions of what I like 
and what I dislike about certain things. When qing is subject to these “prejudices” (pian 
偏) of likes and dislikes, “emotional attachments” (ai 爱) ensue. This process produces 
                                                
167 Graham, “Shih是/fei 非and yu 有/wu 无,” 336-337. 
168 Chan, “Two Ethical Perspectives,” 7-8 
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self-interests and I am unable to free myself of selfish considerations 未能忘爱释私. 
Guo Xiang expresses this view in Chapter Two of the Zhuangzi: 
 
庄子: 是非之彰也，道之所以亏也，道之所以亏，爱之所以成。  
Zhuangzi: The manifestation of “this is” and “this is not” is the 
reason why the Dao is diminished and emotional attachment [ai] 
becomes complete. 
 
郭象: 无是道亏则情有所偏而爱有所成, 未能忘爱释私, 玄同彼我也。 
Guo Xiang: When the Dao diminishes, predilections [qing 情] become 
subject to prejudice and emotional attachments [ai 爱] are subject to 
completion, with the result that people can no longer forget emotional 
attachments, free themselves from selfish considerations, and arcanely 
unite the other with the self [xuan tong biwo 玄同彼我].169 
 
 
This brings us back to Chapter One of this thesis, where I have examined Guo 
Xiang’s construal of the statement of zhiren wuqing. The analysis of Guo Xiang’s 
argument above is perfectly consistent with his idea of wuqing. In thinking that wuqing is 
a state whereby one recognizes the futility of shifei, Guo Xiang urges one to transcend 
one’s self-interests by harmonizing one’s qing with Dao. In so doing, qing is no longer 
subject to emotional disturbances and attachments produced by the cognitive sways of 
xin. Henceforth, one’s qing is harmonized with Dao, and any expression of qing in 
accordance with Dao is considered as legitimate. 
 
 
                                                
169 Lynn, Zhuangzi, 43. 
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Ziran and self-forgetting   
 
Why does Guo Xiang think that being oblivious to shifei is ziran? Clearly, in the state of 
ziran, everything arises from Dao and reflects the true nature of Dao, including 
differences 自然之分. Since our xing is an invariable component, a natural allotment 
originating from Dao, differences such as the different xing of different individuals are 
also deemed to be ziran and due to Dao. To differentiate things cognitively is to 
“diminish Dao” (kui dao 亏道), that is, to tarnish the true nature of Dao whereby 
differences are no longer ziran, no longer rooted in Dao. Instead, such differences 
become shi and fei, the result of a person’s preferences, “prejudices” (pian 偏), 
“emotional attachments” (ai 爱) and “selfish considerations” (si 私) that do not originate 
from Dao but from the individuals themselves.  
 
As expressions of “pian, ai and si,” shifei leads to notions of “this one” shi 是 and 
“the other” bi 彼. To eradicate “shi and fei” and “shi and bi,” one has to abide by ziran as 
a form of “cognitive self-forgetting” (wangwo, 忘我) and unite all differences 遗彼忘我, 
冥此群异.170 Essentially, Guo Xiang believes that in a state of ziran, there are no 
distinctions between shi and fei, shi and bi, 是非然否, 彼我更对, 故无辩. Abiding by 
ziran, I forget what I like and what I dislike – that is, I forget all the differences 
established by my cognitive actions and thought. In forgetting my partialities, 
                                                
170 Lynn, Zhuangzi, 14. 
  81 
preferences, judgments and attachments, shi and fei are extinguished as I am not 






The sage is someone who has freed himself from self [wuwo 无我] …… 
He allows each of all the different things to find contentment in what 
makes it content and ensures that no one ever has to deny what he deems 
“it is.”  Thus, no individual will ever be made use of by anyone else, and 
the usefulness of all the myriad things becomes useful. When all things in 
themselves become useful, which of them will ever be deemed “it is” or 
which of them will ever be deemed “it is not”!171 
 
 
 Ultimately, Guo Xiang has nothing against differences per se. He says that 
the sage who self-forgets is one who appreciates the differences of all things and 
allows them to grow according to their own xing. Despite the differences that 
exist between things, all things become useful 万物之用用矣 simply by 
conforming to their own xing.  Therefore, there is no need for any differentiation 
based on shifei when things are useful and satisfied with their own xing. For 
example, Guo Xiang would agree that there are differences between a bird, a 
monkey and a fish; there is nothing wrong with making “value-neutral” 
distinctions between a bird, a fish and a monkey. However, it would be wrong to 
make the distinction based on our value judgment that a bird is better than a fish 
because it can fly, or a fish is better than a monkey because it can swim, or a 
monkey is better than a bird because it is a more intelligent species, and so on.  
                                                
171 Lynn, Zhuangzi, 45. 
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Evidently, for Guo Xiang, to be ziran as self-forgetting is to follow one’s 
xing, and not let conscious human efforts “mar” the xing that emanates from Dao, 
which is essentially good and sufficient in itself. Therefore Guo Xiang proclaims 
that everyone is born with a different xing; one has to be comfortable and satisfied 
with one’s natural allotment, and not rely on the differences established by human 




“Right” and “wrong,” “so” and “not so” are changes in the opposition of 
other and self, thus, no distinction really exists between them.  Once free 
of such distinctions, it is possible to let things harmonize with Heaven’s 
allotment.  Since one does nothing but remains content with the natural 




Consequently, the sage never employs shifei, and he lets things stay at the 
“potter’s wheel of heaven” 是以圣人和之以是非而休乎天钧，是之谓两行.173 This is 
because the sage recognizes that “[t]hough the myriad things have myriad bodily forms, 
they are all the same when it comes to self-fulfilment [zide 自得], so their potential is one 
and the same” 万物万形，同于自得，其得一也.174  
 
  
                                                
172 Lynn, Zhuangzi, 60. 
173 Ibid., 43. 
174 Ibid., 47. 
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This “cognitive self-forgetting” in turn leads to a state of self-transcendence 
whereby one achieves oneness with all things. Consequently the “essentials and details, 
the inner and the outer, shall all be smoothly had at once, perfectly identified [minran 
泯然] with them without outward trace [ji 迹]” 则本末内外, 畅然俱得，泯然无迹.175 
This self-forgetting mode integrates conceptions of “inner and outer” 内外 and conflates 
with the myriad things that make up the universe. This is affirmed elsewhere in Chapter 
Two of the Zhuangzi where Guo Xiang talks about how freedom from cognitive 




Everyone affirms himself as a “this one,” thus there is no one who is not a 
“this one”; everyone thinks of everyone else as an “other,” thus there is no 
one who is not an “other.”  Since there is no one who is not an “other,” 
this then means that among everyone in the world there is no one who is a 
“this one”; but, since there is no one who is not a “this one,” this then 
means that among everyone in the world there is no one who is an “other.”  






We have seen how Guo Xiang appropriates creatively from the Zhuangzi to come up with 
a notion of ziran which promotes a view of the self that is embodied in the xing-core of 
an individual. As the principle that governs the existence of all things, ziran not only 
                                                
175 Lynn, Zhuangzi, 62. Please see also Ziporyn, Penumbra Unbound, 39. Brook Ziporyn highlights that 
this oneness is the ziran of the myriad of things, not “transcendence oneness embracing all things from 
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176 Lynn, Zhuangzi, 37-38. 
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implies that the xing of different individuals is not only unique, xing is also self-sufficient 
and inviolable, free from extrinsic forces. Such freedom is defined in terms of freedom 
from a metaphysical entity/reality that imposes ontological dependence and a pre-
determined order on things. Ziran also carries a double meaning of self-forgetting that 
construes freedom in terms of freedom from cognitive absoluteness – one forgets the 
cognitive excesses of shi and fei that lead to notions of shi and bi, thereby becoming 
wuqing in harmonizing one’s qing with Dao. Consequently, one transcends self-interests 
and achieves xuantong. Ipso facto, the double meanings of ziran lead to a view of the self 
that is at once self-sufficient in its existence, and self-forgetting in its experiences with 
the world. Such a view is also consistent with Guo Xiang’s conception of wuqing that is 
depicted as devoid of the cognitive excesses of shifei. 
 
It is important to explore why Guo Xiang has such an understanding of xing as 
ziran. Ultimately, the concept of ziran provides the assurance that one’s xing is sufficient 
in itself. But one’s xing alone is not enough to achieve sagehood, this is especially so in 
the case of the vast majority who is not born with the superior qi that constitutes a sage-
xing. In view of this, Guo Xiang argues that one needs to embark on a process of self-
realization to attain sagehood. For Guo Xiang, self-realization entails two things. First, it 
necessitates an understanding of the transformative processes of the universe. Second, 
such an understanding will lead to self-forgetting that bears on one’s experiences with the 
universe. So, having explained ziran, the principle that governs the existence of all 
things, Guo Xiang would need to explain duhua 独化 (independent transformation), the 
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principle that specifies the interaction of all things in the universe.177 Since duhua refers 
to the correspondences of things in the phenomenal world, his discussion of duhua will 
have to be situated in the context of the interrelatedness of the human experience. Let us 
now turn to the next section to examine this concept more closely. 
                                                
177 I will be using Richard Lynn’s translation of duhua as “independent transformation” throughout this 
thesis. 
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Duhua 独化  and the interrelatedness of all things  
 
Chinese cosmology and symbiotic interrelatedness 
 
At the heart of the Chinese psyche in early China is a view of the cosmos as one of 
mutual interaction and interconnection of the myriad things. Generations of philosophers 
have based their thought assiduously on that precept, and Guo Xiang is no exception. 
There are two facets to the Chinese cosmological system, the first being the symbiotic 
interrelatedness of all entities. Guo Xiang would refer to the passage on the preservation 
of a man’s lifespan in the Zhuangzi to acknowledge that all things interrelate and 




者无由得生; 一理不至，则天年无缘得终。  
For the life of a human being, though his stature be only seven chi 尺in 
height [about 5 feet, 3 inches], the five agents [wuchang 五常, metal, 
wood, water, fire, earth] must all be present in him.  Therefore, though he 
has but this insignificantly small body, it still takes all the resources of 
heaven and earth to provide it.  Thus it is for the myriad things of heaven 
and earth:  whatever exists cannot even for one day do without any of 
them [the five agents], for were even one agent [wu 物] not present, a 
living thing would lack the wherewithal to stay alive, and when something 
does not perfectly realize even one single principle [li 理], it loses the 
means to fulfil its natural span of years.178   
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The second facet is change. It is believed that the myriad things that make up the 
universe are in a constant state of flux 万物万化. Guo Xiang would ascribe to this in 




The sage wanders along the path of change and transformation and so lets 
himself go in a current each new day.  As the myriad things undergo 
myriads of transformations, so he undergoes myriads of transformations 
along with them.  Since such transformations are limitless, he too is 




Given such a view of Chinese cosmology, the self does not exist alone, deeply 
abstracted in its own existence. It exists in a fluid environment whereby the myriad things 
interact with and interrelate to each other. Nonetheless, despite such interactions, Guo 
Xiang would insist that the self ought to remain ziran in this state of constant flux. In the 
previous section, we have established that ziran is self-sufficient and self-forgetting for 
Guo Xiang. That means that in an individual’s correspondences with the world, his xing-
core is self-sufficient and complete on its own – it does not derive from the happenings, 
events and changes of his environment. In addition, his xing-core is self-forgetting – it 
remains unmoved by things by not partaking in cognitive excesses. Guo Xiang would 
take a conceptual step further and claim that as “the myriad things undergo myriads of 
transformations, so he [the sage] undergoes myriads of transformations along with them” 
万物万化，亦与之万化. So the sage is one who embodies changes while remaining self-
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sufficient and self-forgetting in his existence. The critical question arises as to how one 
can be self-sufficient and self-forgetting, while staying related to the environment at the 
same time. Guo Xiang’s solution lies in the concept of duhua. 
 
 
Self-creation and unconscious existence  
 
Guo Xiang claims that the interactions between the myriad things are governed by the 
principle of duhua 独化 which specifies that all things derive from themselves and do not 
depend on anything else. In other words, all things happen by “causelessness” (wuyin 
无因).180 Here, it will profit us to relate the story of the penumbra and shadow found in 
Chapter Two of the Zhuangzi as Guo Xiang tries to explain the idea of duhua through this 
parable. Guo Xiang rejects the claim that the penumbra is dependent on the shadow of the 
bodily form, the latter of which is in turn dependent on a creator 世或谓罔两待景, 
景待形, 形待造物者.181 This is because he believes that the creator cannot be wu or 
something existent. He maintains that if the creator is wu, it cannot create anything 则胡 
能造物哉; if the creator is something existent, it cannot manifest all bodily forms 
则不足以物众形.182 Therefore, there is no such thing as a “master-creator” or “master 
controller,” reason being that “all bodily forms first have to derive from things 
themselves” 众形之自物.183 From this, Guo Xiang reaches the following conclusion. 
                                                
180 Lynn, “The Influence of Guo Xiang’s Commentary,” 3. 
181 Lynn, Zhuangzi, 61. 
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183 Ibid. 
  89 
First, “the creator is no master, for all things create themselves, and, since all things 
create themselves, they do not depend on anything else for this to happen – such is the 
true way of Heaven and Earth” 故造物者无主, 而物各自造, 物各自造而无所待焉, 
此天地之正也.184 Second, “things exist as if they were induced to do so and yet remain 
unaware how it is that existence happens. In the same way, each thing thrives and yet 
remains unaware how it is that it thrives” 是以诱然皆生而不知所以生, 
同焉皆得而不知所以得也.185 Guo Xiang’s conclusion indicates three distinct features 
about the nature of all things: (1) self-creation 自造; (2) no master 无主; and (3) 
unconscious existence 生而不知所以生.  
 
These features hark back to Guo Xiang’s notion of ziran as the principle that 
governs the existence of the myriad things. Recall that his central thesis focuses on Dao 
as ziran as he rejects Wang Bi’s notion of Dao as wu. As we have seen earlier, ziran 
carries a double meaning of:  
 
(1) Self-sufficiency or the lack of external intervention (that belongs to metaphysical 
absoluteness). Guo Xiang believes that all things which are rooted in Dao are self-
sufficient because of ziran – they self-create and do not have any master-
controller自造无主. Therefore Guo Xiang says that “the creator is no master, for all 
things create themselves” 故造物者无主，而物各自造. Due to the inherent self-
sufficient nature of ziran, the myriad things do not “depend on anything external” 
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不待乎外.186 We can see here that Guo Xiang’s priority is on self-determination and self-
sufficiency, as he emphatically denies dependence of any kind. The application of this 
logic to the relationship between things is such that when myriad things engage in duhua, 
they too are dependent on nothing 无待. This is why Guo Xiang maintains that “the 
principle of duhua (becomes) readily apparent” when the relationship between things is 
that of non-dependency 至于无待，而独 化之理明矣.187  
 
(2) Self-forgetting that implies a state that is oblivious to cognitive absoluteness in the 
form of cognitive differences, partialities and self-interest. In this way, distinctions of 
“shi and fei,” “shi and bi” are forgotten as one achieves oneness with the universe. On 
this view, the self-forgetting aspect of ziran means that everything comes into being 
without knowing how or why 是以诱然皆生而不知所以生.  Therefore since all things 
are rooted in ziran, they thrive without knowing how or why 同焉皆得而不知所以得也  
in their interactions with each other.188 The law of duhua would specify that the myriad 
things function and interact spontaneously without the need of any conscious volition that 
imposes a pre-determined course on things. This is to act with “unintentionality” (ouran 
偶然).189 In other words, everything interacts with each another, transforms and develops 
according to its “innate tendencies” (youji 由己) without any conscious deliberation or 
willing. 
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We can infer two things. First, Guo Xiang’s theory of duhua is concerned with the 
transformation that does not derive from external influences or deliberation. In his 
conception of the universe, the self exists in an environment where all things flourish; 
even if they are interrelated, they are not dependent on one another. Thus, the self in this 
state of flux would remain comfortable, unaffected and complete in itself, even as it 
interacts with the others.190 This means that even though I exist in an environment of 
changes, my xing-core (which is ziran: Self-sufficient and self-forgetting) that emanates 
from Dao remains unchanged by my relationships with the many elements in this context. 
I am defined by this xing-core, not by my relationships with the other entities. This 
assures that the xing-core of my “self” remains sufficient in its existence and 
development.  
 
Second, since duhua specifies the principle that governs the interactions between 
the self and all things in an ever-changing universe, when things engage in duhua, they 
interact spontaneously without conscious deliberation or value judgments.191 While Guo 
Xiang denies external intervention and conscious volition, his theory of duhua 





One who embodies heaven and earth and arcanely merges [ming 冥] with 
change and transformation [bianhua 变化] does so just as hands and feet, 
with their different functions, and the five viscera, with their different 
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offices, never consciously interact [xiangyu 相与], yet all the joints in the 
body work together harmoniously.  This is what “interact without 
consciously interacting” means.  They never help one another yet inner 
and outer both find succor.  This is what “help without helping” means.192      
 
 
To put it in another way, everything has its own determinacy and “each is alone in 
its own determinacy and forgets everything outside itself and also within itself.”193 
Oneness with the universe is achieved through a “complete correspondence with one’s 
own determinacy,” which leaves no room for the others.194 The obliteration of otherness 
simply means unity without distinctions. So while each entity is self-sufficient, ziran and 
forgetting itself and everyone else, it is also transforming, “interacting and accepting 
whatever it encounters as itself.”195 This is made possible because the interactions 
between all things in the universe belong to a symbiotic interrelatedness whereby all 
things mutually benefit from their correspondences with each other. Trusting by the 
nature of ziran, everything survives – by taking care of itself, the self takes care of the 
others 未为不足以相治也.196 This is evident in Guo Xiang’s remarks about the mutual 






As long as each servant acts according to his or her allotment of talents, 
they will never fail to be up to taking charge of each other.  Taking charge 
of each other means, for example, that each hand, foot, ear, eye, each of 
the four limbs and each of the hundred joints in addition to each having its 
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own jurisdiction also exercises mutual sovereign control over the others.197 
Conclusion 
 
It is important for us to note here that Guo Xiang’s conception of self does not conform 
to the Western idea of the ego-self that exists apart from the ever-changing environment. 
For him, the self interacts with all things within the environment; it has no ego for it 
partakes in the transformation of the cosmos, and accepts the different contexts it finds 
itself in without impinging on the integrity of its xing-core. The self that engages in 
duhua when it interacts with the others does not compromise its xing-core to 
accommodate to the changes that the environment imposes on it. But that does not mean 
it furthers its own self-interest over the others. Rather, it embarks on a process of self-
forgetting as its xing-core remains unmoved by the things it corresponds with. That is, the 
self does not yield to the cognitive excesses of shifei, and transforms comfortably with 
the myriad things in the universe. 
 
Guo Xiang’s theory of transformation allows him to construe an account of self-
determination and self-realization in an interrelated environment. Therefore the sage who 
achieves self-realization is one who embodies changes in that he “understands the 
processes of transformation,” and realizes the futility of “shi and fei,” and “shi and bi.”198 
When differences between shi and bi are abolished in their mutual interactions, the sage 
achieves oneness and unity with the universe. Thus for Guo Xiang, to conflate into the 
universe is to abide by ziran (to be self-sufficient and self-forgetting), and engage in 
duhua in an interdependent world. Following that, the self can be completely involved 
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with the others, while remaining completely at ease with its own xing at the same time.199 
While Guo Xiang’s priority on the inviolability of self is clear, his idea of self-realization 
that is linked to ziran and duhua (even though both concepts are characterized by self-
sufficiency) does not lead to the eventual exclusion of the individual from the universe 
consisting of interrelated entities.  
 
 
                                                
199 Please see Ziporyn, Penumbra Unbound, 88-95, Tang Yijie, Guo Xiang Yu Wei-Jin xuanxue (Hubei: 
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fixed nature within an individual and therefore a person’s xing is an unchanging, permanent content and his 
activity is an expression of this essence. Ziporyn would disagree, preferring to translate xing as per Wang 
Deyou’s analysis as a momentary determinacy that allows one to “vanish” into other entities as one 
transforms with them. This issue deserves a proper and separate analysis that I am not able to undertake in 
this thesis. 
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Philosophical implications of xing 性  
 
Certainly, Guo Xiang has many reasons for advocating such a conception of xing. 
Closely linked to the Wei-Jin dialogue on xing is the idea of sagehood and its 
attainability. Guo Xiang wants to maintain that sagehood is possible for everyone even 
though we are all born with different qi-capacities, hence possessing different xing. 
Instead of dragging his feet over the “different xing and qi” issue, he accepts the unique 
nature of xing and delineates a theory of self-transformation based on achieving the 
insight that shi and fei are in vain. In other words, by accepting the unique nature of xing, 
Guo Xiang has to concede that xing (at different levels) is ziran, that is, complete in 
itself. By pushing for the attainability of sagehood despite the different levels of qi 
inherent in human beings, Guo Xiang is forced to advance a theory of self-realization and 
transformation that is not utterly dependent on one’s xing, but upon the realization of the 
futility of shifei.   
 
Guo Xiang’s call for us to abandon shifei in search of the truth would form the 
core of his ideas underlying this Wei-Jin sense of self. His bias against shifei makes it 
easy for him to make the following claims. First, our inborn xing that emanates from Dao 
is good. This is regardless of whether we have exceptional qi. Because Dao is ziran, there 
is no cognitive distinction of whether I am born with better qi-constitution than another 
person. The xing-core that Dao endows me with does not make me better or worse-off in 
that sense. Second, if my xing abides by ziran, my qing is harmonized with Dao. It is 
perfectly fine to express the affective part of my qing that accords with Dao. It is the 
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cognitive excesses of xin that we should be wary of. In other words, by expressing true 
qing that accords with Dao, I do not let the cognitive activities of my xin sway my xing to 
a highly disturbed emotive state.  
 
For Guo Xiang, xing is usually described as an ideal state to attain and a return to 
one’s original nature.200 I am deemed as acting naturally if my qing is an expression of 
my xing that is harmonized with Dao. I can be happy or sad, cross or calm – the full 
expression of my “natural feelings” is allowed because I am acting on the basis of my 
original xing. In this respect, moral sentiments such as “benevolence” ren 仁and 
“righteousness” yi义must have a place in the xing of human beings.201 If individuals act 
according to their xing, ren and yi will naturally reveal themselves in the actions and lives 
of these persons. In Chapter Sixteen of the Zhuangzi, Guo Xiang says,  
 
仁义发中而还任本怀则志得矣 志得矣其迹则乐矣. 
When benevolence and righteousness burgeon forth within and one thus 
returns to trust to one’s original state of mind, one’s disposition is 




When I give in to cognitive excesses, I veer from my original xing. My actions are 
disturbed by cognitive excesses, and the feelings that I express are no longer rooted in my 
original xing but in self-created values and judgements. For instance, I volunteer at 
                                                
200 I owe this to Professor Chan for pointing this out to me. 
201 The issue regarding the content of xing is a separate issue that cannot be sufficiently covered here. At 
this point, it suffices to mention that Guo Xiang would view renyi as moral sentiments that exist in the xing 
of individuals. However, if we take renyi as external moral standards, he would maintain that renyi are 
outward manifestations of our xing conditions. 
202 Lynn, Zhuangzi, 197. 
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various organizations for children with mental disabilities and I am happy doing so 
because I am expressing ren, my natural love for these special kids. But if I volunteer 
because I think such work is highly laudable and my friends will thereby hold me in 
esteem, I am not acting from my natural feelings or xing. Rather, I am acting from 
cognitive excesses that establish my actions based on what I value to be good or bad.  
 
Such a distinctive way of thinking about xing also brings a fuller explanation to 
the concept of qing. Guo Xiang believes that all things that arise from Dao accords with 
the true nature of Dao, therefore they must be good. In that sense, affective qing that arise 
from Dao without the intervention of the cognitive activities of xin must naturally be 
good. By re-visiting the issue of qing in terms of its affective and cognitive capacities, we 
can tell that Guo Xiang’s intention is to highlight his opposition to shifei, the cognitive 
excesses of xin. This is not surprising considering his position on ziran as (1) self-
sufficient, ontologically independent of external sources, and (2) self-forgetting that is 
devoid of cognitive absoluteness. By singling out the cognitive thoughts and actions of 
man as the main culprit, Guo Xiang maintains consistently throughout his work that xing 
that abides by ziran cannot depend on an external source in terms of a metaphysical or 
cognitive absolute.  
 
Guo Xiang’s refutation of the universal principle or entity (in the form of an 
external source) through the concept of ziran and duhua must be highlighted here. It is 
significant because it forms the core of (1) his rejection of Wang Bi’s thesis of Dao as wu 
(we have covered this earlier); (2) it explains how he is able to interpret xing in 
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essentialist terms without having to concede that everything must now be subjugated 
under the inevitability of abstract universals; and (3) it shows us how an essentialist 
construal of xing does not preclude the relatedness of the human experience.  
 
With respect to (2), recall Ames’ critique that an essentialist interpretation of xing 
cannot accommodate the particularity of our relationships with the others. Here, we see 
how Guo Xiang is able to solve this problem creatively, simply by maintaining that there 
is no universal causation by a teleological entity or substance. By virtue of the aspects of 
self-creation and lone-transformation engendered by ziran and duhua, everything is 
ontologically independent; there is no dependence on a universal principle or being. 
Without a universal controlling master or principle imposing a fixed order on things, the 
nature of our relationships with the others must be unique and particular in themselves.  
 
With respect to (3), Guo Xiang’s idea of xing as ziran denotes an essential 
endowment that is sufficient in itself, and that cannot be changed; at the same time, the 
principle of duhua allows things to flourish and grow independently without an external 
controller. This means that even as we interact with the others, our xing-core is not 
moved or affected by our relationships with the others because it is ziran, complete in 
itself. Thus we still maintain our xing-core of irreducibility even as we thrive and grow 
with the others in an environment of interrelatedness. From this, Guo Xiang is able to 
effectively accommodate the idea of relatedness through an essentialist conception of self 
that have unique, mutually entailing and fulfilling relationships with the myriad things in 
the universe. 








In general, the study of self in Chinese philosophy is grounded on the assumption that we 
must permit Chinese sensibilities, notably that of the interactive character of human 
experience in order to gain a richer understanding of the notion of self in the Chinese 
context. By ferreting out the idea of relatedness, Ames and several eminent scholars have 
re-formulated the Chinese idea of self as one that arises from the relations a person forms 
with his social or natural environments. The sheer persuasive force of their argument 
quickly translates into the dominant approach to understanding the self in Chinese 
philosophy; this view becomes a powerful counter to anyone who is tempted to construe 
the Chinese sense of self in essentialist terms. 
 
While I fully agree that Ames and company have highlighted an important 
cultural dominant in Chinese ideology, I think the idea of the relational self precludes the 
understanding of other “alternative” elements of Chinese thought that allow for an 
essentialist conception of self without falling outside the framework of relatedness. The 
central difficulty that I have with Ames’ theory is this: Ames seems to suggest that the 
Chinese has only one finite way of expressing the interrelatedness of their experiences 
with the others. But the fact is that Chinese philosophy is diverse and multi-faceted. 
Surely, within the entire spectrum of Chinese thought, there is more than one way to 
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make sense of the relatedness of the human experience. I don’t think that Ames has cast 
the net wide enough to accommodate the possibility of other interpretations of self within 
the Chinese context. By attempting to capture Chinese culture in a single theory of the 
relational self, Ames seems to overlook the extraordinary richness and complexity of 
Chinese thinking. His focus on the “dominant” relational understanding of self has led 
him to exclude what have now become the other “dormant” conceptions of self in 
Chinese thought – I think that Ames’ focus-field approach to the relational self is done at 
the expense of underplaying differences within the field of Chinese ideology across time 
and place. Let us not forget that China is geographically immense, consisting of different 
ideologies, ethnic cultures and ruling elites that have undergone several changes over the 
course of history. It is completely natural to have differences, anomalies and complexities 
within the Chinese intellectual tradition. Such differences must be acknowledged in 
making sense of the Chinese idea of self. 
 
In arguing for an essentialist conception of self that harmonizes the relatedness of 
human experience, this thesis hopes to offer a gritty stand. Perhaps Ames has not 
provided an exhaustive account or a complete cross-section of the Chinese thinking of 
self. So let us not deny the value of what such “alternative” thinking has to say about the 
Chinese culture. We have much to learn from thinkers like Guo Xiang, especially his 
thoughts about the xing of an individual and how this relates to the understanding of self 
in Chinese thought. 
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I find Guo Xiang’s thought fascinating because it represents an alchemy of sorts. 
At first blush, the Wei-Jin view of self that is implicit in Guo Xiang’s thought seems to 
appeal mostly to the Western notion of the unitary self that establishes that the “I” that I 
am must be a subject of an intrinsic nature that has the power to form my own inner 
orientations and impressions. Clearly, if Guo Xiang maintains that my xing is due to Dao, 
the qualities that I have must have been present at birth. These are innate characteristics 
that establish the inviolability and uniqueness of my xing-core. In this respect, these traits 
of mine are independent of any relations that I form with an external order. Yet, by no 
means is Guo Xiang denying the relatedness of human experience. Whereas this Wei-Jin 
construal of self may be close to the Western understanding of the self as a unitary 
construct, it is dissimilar in the respect that it acknowledges the self’s interactions with an 
external order as integral to itself. The relationship between the self and the environment 
is harmonizing and blending as the self engages in mutually entailing relationships with 
the others. Obviously, this does not fall under the Western model of the individualistic 
self that portrays the relationship between the self and the universe as one of antagonism.  
 
It is easy for Guo Xiang to establish such a view. After all, his understanding of 
the universe is symptomatic of the Wei-Jin perception of the cosmos as benevolent and 
nurturing to mankind – as such, there is no need for an individual to build defences of any 
sorts against the environment. Unlike the Darwinian universe in which everything 
competes to survive, this is a benign order whereby mutual generation and reinforcement 
drive the flourishing of the myriad things. As far as Guo Xiang’s thought is concerned, 
the law of duhua allows for a highly accepting self that absorbs and accepts the 
  102 
environment without having to “sacrifice” the sanctity of its xing-core. In addition, ziran 
forms the natural limits to the self’s development and growth, so there is no need for any 
other type of monitors to check the implosion of the ego-self either. In other words, the 
self that is ziran is the self that is not egoistical and focused on pursuing its own narrow 
self-interests – it is comfortable with itself as it accepts and transforms with the myriad 
things. Ergo, due to the lack of tension between the self and the external order, the 
exercise of the Western notion of individualist will and volition is of no use to Guo 
Xiang’s conception of self.  
 
In this sense, Guo Xiang would claim that while there are particular 
characteristics of the xing-core that are innate and inviolable, it does not necessarily 
follow that the self is thereby immutable. Certainly, Guo Xiang would agree that in its 
interactions with the world, the self can change to a certain extent, and is amenable to 
growth and development within certain limits.  However, such changes cannot be the 
dramatic or radical changes that will produce a different sort of character altogether.  For 
instance, these are not the extreme character changes found in Shakespeare’s Macbeth, in 
which Macbeth transformed from a noble, courageous man into a treacherous murderer 
under the influence of Lady Macbeth. Rather, these are the changes in degree or strength 
in basic inclinations, and will not involve a complete or total change that obliterates the 
innate characteristics of the xing-core.  
 
Even if Ames is completely spot on the fact that the optimal human experience 
lies in one’s relations with the others in an interrelated universe, this does not necessarily 
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entail that selfhood has to be situated in relations as such. The beauty of Guo Xiang’s 
thought is that it takes into account the relational nature of the human experience while 
maintaining an essentialist interpretation of selfhood. A person’s sense of selfhood is 
determined by his xing-core of inviolability and characterized by his mutually entailing 
relationships with the others at the same time. Such an interpretation of xing emphasizes 
the uniqueness of the individual’s inner traits that are present in him, allowing him to 
harmonize his essential nature with the particular relations that he forms with his family, 
friends and the community.  
 
Plainly, Ames’ construal of xing as an “achievement concept” that arises from 
relations does not apply to Guo Xiang’s idea of xing. For Guo Xiang, xing is not simply a 
human achievement, or an enactment of our ongoing relations with other people. The self 
is not conditioned by its environment because a person’s xing is not about what he 
achieves in the roles he assumes in the world. Nonetheless this fact does not rule out or 
take for granted my active participation, involvement and growth in these contexts. To a 
certain degree, Guo Xiang’s thought is able to accommodate Ames’ belief that human 
actualization bears on the relationships one establishes with the others in the community. 
For example, I think that Guo Xiang’s account allows for an individual to be completely 
comfortable with his self-identity – he is effortless and relaxed, perfectly at ease with his 
own “self.” He is open to accepting “otherness” because he sees no distinction between 
himself and others. Since he feels good about himself, and is not threatened by 
“otherness,” he can effectively engage in mutually entailing relationships, thereby 
contributing to the growth and development of himself, as well as the persons that he 
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associates with. Therefore his actualization has nothing to do with the nurturing of some 
abstract universal qualities (usually associated with an essentialist reading of selfhood). 
Rather, it is the fulfilling and mutually reinforcing relationships that he establishes with 
the others that will count as an important feature of self-development. 
 
In short, when it comes to self-realization, Guo Xiang’s particular blend of xing-
core and relatedness focuses on self-sufficiency and self-determination in ziran while the 
self engages in duhua in its interdependent relationships with the other things in the 
universe. It turns out that the self has multi-affiliations with the cosmos where human 
activity is defined by its self-sufficiency and harmonious unity with all things at the same 
time. Therefore, the self that is attributed to Guo Xiang’s thought is really about a 
dynamic, organic conception of human existence whereby our lives are not hermetically 
sealed off from the environment but are seen as interacting with, and reinforcing the 
myriad things in the universe. In this manner, the importance of Guo Xiang’s work lies in 
helping us uncover an essentialist understanding of selfhood that still does full justice to 
the relatedness of human experience in Chinese thought. Studying Guo Xiang’s work will 
give us another perspective on how we view the self in Chinese philosophy that is quite 
different from Ames’ approach, or a Western understanding of self that is based on an 
individualistic account of humanity.  
 




Holistic explanations of self 
 
Today, most scholars are aware that the complexities of Chinese history and philosophy 
have given rise to a plurality of views about the nature of self. They agree that there is no 
“single and distinct” conception, but various conceptions of self. Therefore, the main 
concern is to locate the study of self within a larger discursive framework without having 
to endure a certain degree of conceptual dissonance, especially in relation to the 
conventional ways of thinking about the self. In recognition of this, scholarly attention 
has been focused on identifying a coherent structure to guide our discussions on the 
multiple notions of self in Chinese philosophy. At the most fundamental level, such 
efforts have resulted in holistic theories that are used to understand the relatedness of self 
in Chinese philosophy.  
 
According to the Oxford dictionary, holism is the theory that certain wholes are to 
be regarded as greater than the sum of their parts.203 Essentially, to understand the 
different parts, the whole must be considered. Here, I am using the terms “holism” or 
“holistic theories” in accordance to the manner Munro classifies them in his book, 
Individualism and Holism: Studies in Confucian and Taoist Values. There, Munro 
contrasts “holism” to “individualism.” “Individualism” emphasizes the individual who is 
independent of the society. Therefore, an account of the person can be construed without 
the consideration of the society or units larger than an individual. In contrast, “holism” 
                                                
203 The Oxford Modern English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
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seeks to understand individuals in relation to the society or cosmos. According to Munro, 
holistic explanations of self are concerned with the following values: (1) role fulfilment 
in hierarchical structure; (2) social or cosmic order; (3) harmony of individuals and 
universe; (4) comprehensive understanding of universe; and (5) co-creativity between 
individuals and universe.204  
 
In the main, holistic theories employ the Maussian understanding that there is a 
universal structure of the thinking of self that is held to be universal and necessary, but 
that takes different forms in different contexts.205  Marcel Mauss distinguishes between 
personne (person) and moi (self) doctrines, stating that the former (which sees the self as 
a locus of relations of kinship, citizenship, etc.) has cross-cultural validity while the latter 
(which sees the self as integrated selfhood) depicts an understanding of self that is unique 
to Western thought. Holistic theories seek to grasp the Chinese construct of self under the 
personne theory that posits the self as a configuration of relations that is interdependent 
with the world.  
 
There are two dominant models of holistic theories of the self that are used in 
Chinese philosophy. They are namely the (1) “one-many” model (universal self); and (2) 
“part-whole” model (organic self).206 Without going into the details of the one-many 
                                                
204 Munro, “Introduction,” 19-22. 
205 Marcel Mauss, “A Category of the human mind: the notion of person; the notion of self,” in The 
Category of the Person, 1-26. Please see also in the same book, Steven Lukes “Conclusion,” 283-284.  
206 James Wang Qing-jie, “Genealogical Self and a Confucian Way of Self-Making,” 1-13; available from 
http://www.confuchina.com/07%20xifangzhexue/Genealogical%20Self.htm; Internet; accessed 10 March 
2009. 
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model, it suffices to note that most scholars utilize the part-whole model as an underlying 
framework for understanding the self in Chinese thought today.207  
 
The part-whole model regards parts as variable components of an integrated 
whole or structure such as the society or Dao. Parts exist within the wholes, and are 
inseparable from the whole. Munro remarks, “[t]he whole is all that exists and the parts 
are linked with each other and to the whole, not as pieces of a pie, but as roles in a net, 
relationally.”208 The “whole” in this model has its own identity and goals. The individual 
is understood in terms of the function of his relation to the teleological whole and its 
purpose. Notably, in this schema of relatedness, it is believed that parts have “no inherent 
principle of individuation.” Further, parts are random and changeable, while the whole 
remains coherent and stable.209  Therefore, the nature of the self in Chinese thought is 
such that it is never independent, but is always conceived as related to, and 
interdependent with a world that is regular and enduring. On this view, individuals can be 
in different places, at different times and play different roles. What is crucial is that all 
these different roles are interrelated; they all serve to achieve integrated wholeness and 
contribute to the purpose of the whole.  
 
                                                
207 James Wang, “Genealogical Self,” 1-3. According to Wang, the one-many model correlates to the 
Western understanding of self by focusing on the dichotomy between the “one Whole” and “many 
individuals.” Briefly, this view (represented by Fung,) posits that the true self is found in the (external) 
transcendental principle of the universe (tianli 天理) or the Way (Dao 道). Although tianli is the same for 
all individuals, we all have different qi-levels 气 that constitute our individual self. So in order to arrive at 
the true self, we must embrace selflessness and subsume our individual interests for the higher good of the 
Whole or Dao. I will not dwell on the “one-many” model as it panders to the Western view of self, assumes 
a transcendental identity, and ignores the uniqueness of self. These points do not contribute to the claims I 
want to establish in this thesis. 
208 Munro, “Introduction,” 19. 
209 Chad Hansen, “Individualism in Chinese Thought,” in Individualism and Holism, 41-42. 
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The central difficulty with this part-whole model is that selfhood derives from 
the relations with a holistic entity – it becomes whole-based and lacks 
“individuation.” Fully aware of this threat to the issue of self, Ames tries to address 
the lack of “individuation” in selfhood through another approach – the focus-field 
model. In the focus-field model, each unique self emerges from the focus-field of 
relations that contextualizes it. Instead of being subsumed under a “whole,” the self is 
conceived as “many unique selves” that arise out of its interaction with a dynamic 
cosmos – such uniqueness is occasioned by the self’s response to the particular nature 
of each context, and by getting itself re-negotiated in every circumstance. Hence, 








The relational self in classical Confucianism 
 
Ames approaches the relational self by exploring mostly the concept of self in 
Confucianism. By appealing to an understanding of the Chinese natural cosmology 
espoused in the Great Learning (Da xue 大学), he claims that the underlying assumption 
in classical Chinese thought is that “personal, societal, political and even cosmic orders 
are immanent, coterminous, and mutually entailing.”210 According to the Da xue, the 
Chinese cosmological sense of order arises from the harmonious interdependence and 
coordination of the myriad of things (wan wu 万物) that make up the entire world. Ames 
maintains that the nature of self reflects this cosmological symbiotic tendency. In this 
respect, the self is never independent or separate, but is intrinsically related to and 
interdependent within this field of substances.211 As a “focal self,” it “inheres in the 
natural world as its field, where it shapes and is shaped by the field in which it 
resides.”212  
 
Thus, in Confucian thought, the self is defined relationally and collaterally by acts 
of contextualization, or by what it does in the world. The self becomes a focal point of 
relations, shaped by an enacted pattern of interactions with the universe. Ultimately, the 
                                                
210 Ames and Wimal Dissanayake, “Introduction,” Self and Deception, 220. 
211 Ibid. 
212 Ibid. 220-222. Here, Ames invokes the historical example of the formation of Han as concentric circles 
of inner (China/royal domain) and outer zones (barbarians/outer lords) to illustrate the sense of centripetal 
order radiating graduated degrees of importance. Such an order forms an analogy to the “focal self” that 
Ames talks about.  
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Confucian notion of self arises from its interactions with the other members of a social 
organization. Ames points out: 
 
In fact for Confucius, there is no core individual – no “self”, no “soul” – 
that remains once the layers of family and community relations are peeled 
away. Each of us is irreducibly social as the sum of the roles we live – not 
play – in our relationships and transactions with others. The goal of living, 
then, is to achieve harmony and enjoyment for oneself and for others 
through acting optimally appropriate in those roles and relationships that 
make us uniquely who we are.213 
 
 
In other words, the Confucian model of self is an “open system” that is 
invariably connected to the family, community, society, state and cosmos.214 
However, that does not prevent me from having a conception of myself as a person 
that is distinct from say, my husband Khai’s bodily self, for instance. It simply means 
that my selfhood is constituted by the fact that I am the wife of Khai. Such an 
approach shares its similarities with the Meadian model of self that focuses on the 
development of the self through its relations with others.215 How we engage with 
others in the community will be defined by the principle of deference (shu 恕) that 
operates within ritual patterns (li 礼), and is shaped by relationships starting from the 
family and extending all the way out to the society.216 
 
                                                
213 Ames, Confucian Role Ethics, 10-11. 
214 Ames and Wimal Dissanayake, “Introduction,” in Self and Deception, 4. 
215 Gananath Obeyesekere, “The Illusory Pursuit of Self - A review of Culture and Self: Asian and Western 
Perspectives, eds., A.J.Marsella et al,” Philosophy East and West Vol., 40, no. 2 (Apr., 1990): 241-244. 
According to Obeyesekere, G. H Mead tries to show the emergence of self through human socialization of 
“I” (self) interacting with “You” (others).  
216 Hall and Ames, Thinking from the Han, 46. 
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The relational self in classical Daoism 
 
Ames declares that the Daoist sense of thinking is similar to the Confucian sense of 
thinking in that they both operate by shu. He insists that the Daoist sense of self must 
therefore be understood in terms of the self’s deferential relationship with the universe. 
This relationship is guided by principles of wuzhi 无知 (non-principled knowledge, or the 
lack of knowledge that resorts to rules and judgments); wuwei 无为 (non-assertive action, 
or action that accords with the de 德 or focus of things); and wuyu 无欲 (objectless 
desire, or the lack of desire to control things).217  
 
According to Ames, wuzhi is to see the world “on its own terms” without 
resorting to fixed standards or rules of discrimination; wuwei is the absence of action that 
interferes with the de of things within one’s sphere of influence; and wuyu is objectless in 
terms of “letting things be” and “letting things go.”218 The three “wu-forms” are 
deferential in three ways. First, they do not impose knowledge, action and desires based 
on human construal, thus leading to a fixed structure or regularity. Second, they do not 
deny the particularity or uniqueness of a situation because they let the world be. Lastly, 
by letting the world be, these principles defer to the spontaneity (ziran 自然) of the 
world. In this sense, the goal of self-forgetting in Daoism is to eschew the construing 
                                                
217 Hall and Ames, Thinking from the Han, 46-48. Ames claims that just as the Confucian self is determined 
by deferential activities guided by roles and relationships (li 礼), the Daoist self is determined by 
deferential activities guided by wuzhi, wuwei and wuyu. 
218 Ibid., 51-54. According to Ames, de is a particular focus that orients something until it achieves its own 
intrinsic excellence. 
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“wo-self” (我-self, objectifying-self); self-cultivation becomes inexorably linked to the 
attainment of the deferential “wu-self.” Here I cite Ames’ remarks: 
 
The wu-forms all provide a way of entertaining, of deferring to, an 
objectless world. Thus the sage is concerned with that sort of knowing, 
acting, and desiring that does not depend upon objects. … In Daoism, the 
self is forgotten to the extent that discriminated objects no longer 
constitute the environs of the self.219 
 
 
 By deferring to the spontaneity of the universe, the wu-self defers to the 
particularity of the context or situation, thus suggesting the primacy of the situation over 
the self. Ames backs his claim by referring to the fish parable of Chapter Seventeen of 
the Zhuangzi.220 When quizzed by Huizi on how he knows the fish are enjoying 
themselves, Zhuangzi says, “I know it by standing here beside the Hao” 我知之濠上 
也.221 Ames contends that Zhuangzi is describing the happiness of the situation 
(我知之濠上也) rather than the happiness of a discrete agent. The Zhuangzi-in-context  
                                                
219 Hall and Ames, Thinking from the Han, 56. 
220 Ames, “Knowing in the Zhuangzi: “From Here, on the Bridge, over the River Hao,” in Wandering at 
Ease in the Zhuangzi, ed., Roger T. Ames (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998), 220-
221. 
221 Watson, Chuang Tzu, 188-189. 
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(as being continuous with the fish) does not deny the fish their difference. Here, he 
writes: 
 
The absence of a discrete and individuated self and the attachments that 
define it, does not discount the importance given to the particular, and to 
the uniqueness of its perspective. In fact, it is only through Zhuangzi’s 
deference to their difference – by allowing them to be what they are – that 
the experience can be optimally “enjoyable” for all concerned.222  
  
 
 Ames’ construal of the wu-self in Daoism has the foremost implication that 
there is no “single self” in the Daoist understanding of self. Each self is unique because it 
is an abstraction of the changing contexts and perspectives. Hence Ames’ view of the 
relational self in Daoism is one that is pluralistic and unique in character. 
 
 
                                                
222 Ames, “Knowing in the Zhuangzi,” 221. Ames claims that Zhuangzi only wants to challenge the idea of 
the discrete agent who subscribes to an objective, crisp and systematic hierarchy of things – Zhuangzi’s 
main complaint is with the uncompromising attachment to fixed categories, rules and conventions that 
obstructs the expression of one’s particular genuineness and spontaneity. So, Zhuangzi would have 
approved of the particular agent whose relationship with things is spontaneity that is always “in context.”  
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